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IMPROVING TAX RULES BY MEANS-TESTING: 
BRIDGING WEALTH INEQUALITY 
AND “ABILITY TO PAY” 
JAMES M. PUCKETT
*
 
Abstract 
The federal income tax can and should do more to address wealth 
disparities and income inequality. The income tax does not directly count 
wealth, and the realization rule and basis “step-up” at death exclude 
substantial amounts of income for the wealthy. The Constitution limits 
Congress’s ability to tax wealth. Despite these serious challenges, this 
Article considers how to potentially bridge the gap between wealth and the 
income tax. For example, asset-based phase-outs in the income tax should 
pass muster without apportionment, although their bite would necessarily 
be limited. The Article posits that the public would be more receptive to 
phase-outs than more progressive tax brackets. Relevant to complexity, the 
existing literature has identified potential mark-to-market solutions to 
correct the exclusion of unrealized gains. The design of asset-based phase-
outs would be prefigured to some extent by whether these proposals gain 
traction. The income tax, to be sure, cannot by itself solve the problem of 
wealth inequality. Principles of tax justice, however, arguably require 
greater attention to wealth in measuring the taxpayer’s “ability to pay.” 
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Introduction 
Amid increases in wealth and income concentration in the United States,
1
 
the federal income tax still serves as “a grand delusion” of progressivity.2 
The federal income tax can and should do more to respond to wealth and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294-96, 347-50 
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013) (noting “explosion” of 
income inequality and increase in wealth inequality since 1980); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized 
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016) (noting that income inequality has 
“sharply increased in the United States since the late 1970s” and concluding that “US wealth 
concentration is currently high by international standards and has considerably increased in 
recent decades”); see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S 
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012) (identifying causes and social costs of 
inequality). Discourse concerning inequality regularly surfaces in the mainstream media, and 
both Democrats and Republicans “talk the talk.” See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Everyone’s 
Talking About Inequality. Here’s How to Tell if They’re Lip Syncing or Really Singing, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2015/04/20/everyones-talking-about-inequality-heres-how-to-tell-if-theyre-lip-syncing-or-
really-singing/; David Iaconangelo, Income Inequality: The Good, the Bad, and How to 
Tackle It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Global-News/2017/0117/Income-inequality-The-good-the-bad-and-how-to-tackle-it (noting 
that after the 2012 election “Republicans in the US have begun to speak the language of 
inequality”). 
 2. Cf. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS 16 (1963) (indicating 
that high marginal tax rates are “a grand delusion”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/3
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income inequality—or, at the very least, more plausibly link the tax burden 
with “ability to pay.”3 To be sure, there are many angles from which to 
approach this problem. Although perhaps natural, the separation of wealth 
from the federal income tax is not inevitable. This Article examines how 
the gap between wealth and ability to pay could be bridged.  
The results of the 2016 election should not silence this timeless 
conversation.
4
 Indeed, House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed progressive-
sounding tax cuts for the poor and middle class and called the plan 
“simpler, fairer, and flatter.”5 As a candidate, President Trump also called 
for flatter tax brackets.
6
 The election, however, did not clearly evidence an 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See infra Section II.A. Although it is a malleable concept, “ability to pay” is the 
principal tax equity norm. See, e.g., 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 308 (D. Appleton & 
Co. 1909) (1848) (“[W]hatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as 
nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all.”); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2, at 171 (A. Allardice 
1822) (1776) (“The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities.”); Edwin R. A. 
Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 562, 767-68 
(1908) (second edition of the author’s 1894 book) (noting centuries-old roots of ability to 
pay norm); Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 867-69 (2002) (asserting 
that ability to pay is generally accepted and citing domestic and foreign sources). 
 4. No doubt from very different perspectives and offering radically different proposals, 
during their 2016 campaigns, Donald Trump, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and 
Senator Bernie Sanders all spoke out about economic inequality. See, e.g., Jon Hartley & 
Glen Hubbard, The Economic Ignorance of Trump and Sanders, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 21, 
2016), http://www.national review.com/article/432986/free-markets-bernie-sanders-donald-
trump-oppose-them-blindly (“The rise of populist candidates — Trump and Sanders, with 
Clinton increasingly tagging on — arguably mirrors the recent trends, in wealth and income 
inequality, documented by economists such as Thomas Piketty . . . .”); Felipe Ossa, The 
Economist Who Brought You Thomas Piketty Sees ‘Perfect Storm’ of Inequality Ahead, NEW 
YORK MAG. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/03/milanovic-
millennial-on-millennial-war-is-next.html (noting economist Branko Milanovic’s remarks 
that “even the word inequality was not politically acceptable, because it seemed like 
something wild or socialist” and asserting that this “began to change a few years ago”). 
 5. Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, A BETTER WAY (June 24, 2016), 
16-17, http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf. As this 
Article goes to press, the House of Representatives has passed a tax reform bill entitled the 
Tax Cut and Jobs Act. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (as passed by House, Nov. 16, 2017) 
[hereinafter TCJA]. A comprehensive analysis of the TCJA and the emerging plan in the 
Senate lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
 6. See TAX POL’Y CTR., WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT DONALD TRUMP’S TAX PLAN (2017), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/141946/what-is-known-about-
donald-trumps-tax-plan_1.pdf; see also Rupert Neate, Trump’s Tax Plan: Massive Cuts for the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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indifference to economic inequality so much as empower voters dissatisfied 
with elites and excited about “change.”7 More generally, tax cuts often 
follow years with high tax rates, and tax increases often follow years with 
low tax rates.
8
 
Current income tax brackets barely distinguish between the upper-middle 
class and the rich.
9
 Indeed, the tax brackets generally apply a lower tax rate 
                                                                                                                 
1% Will Usher ‘Era of Dynastic Wealth’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.the 
guardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/23/trump-tax-plan-cuts-wealthy-low-income-inequality; Lee 
Sheppard, Trump’s Tax Plan, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
leesheppard/2016/11/13/trumps-tax-plan/#58bf2e9e1122. On the other hand, then-candidate 
Trump proposed repealing the step-up in basis at the death of the taxpayer, albeit coupled with 
estate tax repeal. See Allyson Versprille, Trump Plan Repeals Estate Tax, Scraps Capital Gain 
Benefit, BLOOMBERG BNA: NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.bna.com/ trump-plan-repeals-
n57982077269/. 
 7. See Nancy Benac & Emily Swanson, Americans Are Angry at the Government, Desire 
Change, Exit Polls Show, PBS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ rundown/ 
americans-angry-government-desire-change-exit-polls-show/ (noting “simmering discontent of 
the American electorate” and that four in ten voters were “hungry for change” and 
overwhelmingly favored Trump); Stephen Fidler, In the Wake of a Tumultuous Year, the 
Global Elite Face a World of Uncertainty, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj. 
com/articles/in-the-wake-of-a-tumultuous-year-the-global-elite-face-a-world-of-uncertainty-
1484560809 (noting that unemployment or giving up on seeking employment “combined with 
anxieties about immigration and terrorism, have encouraged a backlash against mainstream 
politicians and associated elites”); Beverly Gage, How ‘Elites’ Became One of the Nastiest 
Epithets in American Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/01/03/magazine/how-elites-became-one-of-the-nastiest-epithets-in-american-politics.html 
(asserting that Trump “turn[ed] the 2016 election into a competition between knowledge 
systems: the tell-it-like-it-is ‘people’ versus the know-it-all ‘elites’”); Virginia Postrel, Trump 
Is the Change Voters Wanted, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/view/articles/2016-11-09/trump-is-the-change-voters-wanted (“When exit polls asked 
what quality in a candidate matters most, a plurality of voters, 39 percent, said ‘can bring 
change.’ Trump captured 83 percent of those votes.”). 
 8. See generally William E. Foster, Partisan Politics and Income Tax Rates, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 703 (examining historical influences on tax brackets); Tracey M. Roberts, 
Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925 (2014) (surveying tax bracket 
changes and related historical events).  
 9. For an individual, the 33% bracket begins at income of $191,651; the 35% bracket 
applies next to a very thin slice of income beginning at $416,701; and the top ordinary 
income rate of 39.6% starts at $418,401. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (setting 
forth inflation adjusted tax items for 2017). If enacted, the TCJA would impose a $1 million 
bracket threshold for the 39.6% tax rate for married taxpayers filing jointly. TCJA § 1001(a) 
(revising I.R.C. § 1). Although it cuts taxes for the wealthy, the bill implicitly acknowledges 
that tax rates max out at an inappropriately low level of income under current law. As a 
starting point for discussion, upper-middle class might be defined as the top 20% by income, 
which translates to earning an income of close to $200,000 a year. See Richard V. Reeves, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/3
2018]        IMPROVING TAX RULES BY MEANS-TESTING 409 
 
 
to long-term capital gain income, such gains being predominantly realized 
by the wealthiest taxpayers.
10
 Recent IRS analysis concluded that in 2013, 
much like prior years, the average income tax rate declined from 
approximately 27% within the top 1% of incomes overall to approximately 
24% at the top .001% of incomes.
11
 The top 400 taxpayers have sometimes 
paid an effective rate of less than 20%.
12
 Differences between the top tiers 
are substantial: the top 1% had an average adjusted gross income (AGI) of 
$428,713, while the top .001% had an average AGI of over $45 million.
13
  
This regressive pattern serves as a compelling example of a larger 
problem: the income tax inadequately links the tax burden to taxpayers’ 
ability to pay. Stepping back from the tax brackets, gross income comprises 
only a technical subset of a taxpayer’s increases in wealth from year to 
year. Thus, even if income were a good enough proxy for ability to pay, the 
implementation in the Code falls short.
14
  
                                                                                                                 
The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class, BROOKINGS (Sept. 3, 
2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2015/09/03-separation-
upper-middle-class-reeves. As Reeves aptly responds to the admitted complexity of defining 
the term: 
Class is of course made up of a subtle, shifting blend of economic, social, 
education and attitudinal factors. . . . [A]n income-based classification will 
provide a good starting point, not least because the trends in income inequality 
are fairly clear: the top fifth is pulling away from the rest of society. 
Id.  
 10. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C)-(D) (2012) (imposing 15% and 20% rates on long-
term capital gains) with I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2012) (imposing up to 39.6% rate on ordinary 
income). The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the capital gains preference 
costs over $1 trillion in a ten-year period and that the top 1% enjoy 68% of the tax savings 
from the preference. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES 
IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf. 
 11. See Adrian Dungan, Individual Income Tax Shares, 2013, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., 
Summer 2016, at 82, 82, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-ints-id1609.pdf. A further 
breakdown of the average tax rates at the top of the income spectrum shows the very highest 
tiers paying a lower average rate of tax than the top .1%, which pays the highest tax rate. Id. 
at 89 (the top .001% paid an average rate of 24.12%; the top .01%, an average of 26.21%; 
the top .1%, an average of 27.91%; the top 1%, an average of 27.08%; the top 2%, an 
average of 25.86; and the top 3%, an average of 24.78%). 
 12. See Roberton Williams, Income and Taxes of the Very Rich, 136 TAX NOTES 121, 
121 (2012). 
 13. Dungan, supra note 11, at 82. 
 14. See infra Section I.B.1. Exacerbating this phenomenon, courts sometimes agree with 
taxpayers claiming exclusions that lack any apparent statutory basis. See Alice G. Abreu & 
Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the Definition of 
Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101, 103-04 (2012) (positing that “noneconomic values” underlie 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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In addition, the Code is largely agnostic about the differences between an 
investor whose income consists of $50,000 in taxable interest and a worker 
whose annual salary is $50,000. These two taxpayers are not similarly 
situated. Historically, property ownership was the most important measure 
of taxpaying capacity.
15
 Substantial wealth provides security, flexibility, 
and an opportunity to exercise power. In addition, wealth serves as a proxy 
for untaxed income, so long as the realization rule and other deferral 
mechanisms apply.  
Other federal taxes, in their totality, add up to a system that is much less 
progressive than most would imagine.
16
 Some would argue that the estate 
tax and the corporate tax are already adequate to reduce wealth inequality. 
As Professor Edward McCaffery crisply puts it, however, “The simple 
answer is: No, they are not.”17 Estates now have a multimillion-dollar 
federal estate tax exemption. And substantial avoidance or underreporting 
of estate tax liability seems likely.
18
 Estate tax reform, or transformation 
                                                                                                                 
a “puzzling gap between what the broad definition that Glenshaw Glass would seem to 
include in the tax base and what is actually included”); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. 
Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 345 (2011) (arguing that “income” is 
most apt as a standard so, for example, “the IRS can weigh equity and efficiency, both of 
which [might] point to income, but allow administrability to outweigh them”). 
 15. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 66, 94 (1959); 
EUGENE STEUERLE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, EQUITY AND THE TAXATION OF WEALTH 
TRANSFERS 5-6 (1980); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 245 (1946) 
(citing Cicero and Justinian). That income has become important is no surprise because the 
economy has diversified so much beyond products of the land. See STEUERLE, supra, at 6; 
see also Buehler, supra, at 245-46 (“General property appears to have been regarded as the 
most satisfactory index of personal ability, but its deficiencies were seen and efforts were 
exerted to tax wages, salaries, and other receipts from personal services, and to impose 
commodity taxes that would reach the rich who escaped from property taxation.”).  
 16. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 17. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305, 326 (2017). 
 18. See id. (noting that “Sheldon Adelson was able to transfer nearly $8 billion to his 
family” tax-free and “hundreds of billions of dollars sit in dynasty trusts . . . forever out of 
the estate tax’s reach”); cf. Debrah Rahmin Silberstein, A History of the Death Tax—A 
Source of Revenue, or a Vehicle for Wealth Redistribution, 17 PROB. & PROP. 58, 64 (2003) 
(“The history of the death tax demonstrates that it has greatest political support when the 
purpose is to raise needed revenue. Often that revenue is for a specific purpose, such as 
military spending.”). But see Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: 
Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 168 (2009) [hereinafter 
Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap] (finding one-third of largest estates transferred 
outside family) (“What should one make of the wildly disparate estate tax gap estimates—
76.8%, 22.9%, 13%, and 10%? We believe that the lower estate tax gap estimates may be 
justified[.]”); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/3
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into an accessions tax,
19
 may be harder to achieve than income tax reform 
because the estate tax is so susceptible to public misinformation.
20
 
Meanwhile, the incidence of the corporate tax may fall on labor rather than 
shareholders and likely at an effective rate much lower than the statutory 
rate.
21
 
A wealth tax may appear to be an obvious solution to the problem of 
wealth inequality. Substantial constitutional questions would arise, 
however, unless a wealth tax were apportioned among the states based on 
their respective populations.
22
 The burden of an apportioned wealth tax 
would be arbitrary.
23
 And although there is a plausible argument that an 
unapportioned wealth tax would pass muster, this Article seeks a 
                                                                                                                 
142 TAX NOTES 1231 (2014) [hereinafter Caron & Repetti, 5 Easy Pieces] (recommending 
five estate tax reforms to reduce inequality and promote growth). 
 19. For the distinction between wealth and accessions and the underlying theories for 
choosing between the two tax bases, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: 
Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913, 918-
20 (2016). 
 20. See Mayling Birney et al., Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal the Estate Tax, 59 
NAT’L TAX J. 439, 442 (2006) (“Surveys also consistently show that the number of people in 
favor of repeal [of the estate tax] drops when respondents are given information on 
exemption levels or how many people pay.”); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect 
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1051 (2004) (“The estate tax truly is primarily a 
tax on the super-rich.”); Misperceptions on Estate Tax Detracting from Worthwhile 
Revenues for United States, RUTGERS BUS. SCH. (May 25, 2011), http://www.business.rut 
gers.edu/business-insights/misperceptions-estate-tax-detracting-worthwhile-revenues-united-
states (“There’s a swathe of misinformation that touts the estate tax as applying broadly and 
that’s not true. The tax actually impacts only 0.1% of the American public but if you asked 
100 people, at least 60 of them would say it applies to them.”) (quoting Professor Jay Soled). 
 21. See Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global 
Economy, 30 VA. TAX REV. 355, 371-72 (2010) (suggesting that the corporate tax may only 
be “mildly” progressive); Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The 
Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 
1642 (2005) (“Because no one knows the true incidence of the corporate tax, many studies 
simply present alternative scenarios, with no weighting as to which is more likely to hold in 
reality.”); Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 
433, 433 (2012) (“[G]enerations of corporate tax incidence models have failed to reach a 
clear consensus on this question.”); McCaffery, supra note 17, at 326 (observing that most 
economists say the burden falls on labor rather than shareholders); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., 
President’s Dividends Plan Undertaxes High-Income Taxpayers, 98 TAX NOTES 389, 389 
(2003) (arguing that high-bracket taxpayers are undertaxed on dividends because of 
corporate tax preferences, deferral of shareholder level tax on retained earnings, and the 
availability of step-up in basis at death).  
 22. See infra Section IV.A. 
 23. See infra Section IV.A. 
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workaround: an income tax which incorporates asset-based phase-outs 
should not be a “direct tax.”24 
Beyond the more novel possibility of asset-based phase-outs, this Article 
explores existing proposals and historical precedents, including prior tax 
brackets, capital gains tax rate reform, and repealing the exemption of a 
decedent’s unrealized capital gain. It also explains how the phase-out 
technique would be entwined to some extent with those other options. 
Phase-outs, to be clear, would not amount to a renamed “Buffett Rule.”25 
Achieving fairness in the tax system is an important goal on its own, and 
fairness also bears on consequences. The government’s ability to collect tax 
is at stake; the system remains, for many taxpayers, based on voluntary 
compliance.
26
 The likely social costs of inequality also counsel the pursuit 
of distributive changes in the tax system.
27
 Of course, scholars have long 
disputed whether economic inequality is harmful.
28
 However, this Article 
draws from the substantial evidence that economic inequality is costly.
29
  
A natural extension of the distributive question is whether a particular 
change of tax law should help balance the budget. Although the issue is 
complicated, many would probably say that the need to make progress 
toward a balanced budget is obvious and compelling.
30
 This Article does 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See infra Section IV.C. 
 25. The Buffett Rule seeks to apply a minimum tax rate based on the taxpayer’s realized 
income. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Beyond the ‘Buffett Rule’: Making the Income Tax 
More Progressive, 133 TAX NOTES 705 (2011). Asset-based phase-outs, ideally, would seek 
to achieve vertical equity even in a mark-to-market system, but could still potentially operate 
even in a realization-based income tax. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. See J. T. Manhire, Tax Compliance as a Wicked System, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 235, 244 
(2016). 
 27. See infra Section I.A. 
 28. Cf. HENRY C. SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE: SOME PROPOSALS 
FOR A LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY 12 (Harry D. Gideonese ed., 1934) (remarking that a 
“substantial measure of inequality may be unavoidable or essential for motivation; but it 
should be recognized as evil and tolerated only so far as the dictates of expediency are 
clear”). 
 29. Cf. PIKETTY, supra note, 1 at 16 (“It is long since past the time when we should have 
put the question of inequality back at the center of economic analysis and begun asking 
questions first raised in the nineteenth century.”). 
 30. The Economic and Fiscal Benefits of Pro-Growth Policies: Hearing Before the H. 
Budget Comm., 114th Cong. 1-2 (2016) (statement of John W. Diamond, Ph.D., Rice 
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) (“The federal debt is projected to increase as a 
share of GDP from 77 percent in 2017 to 150 percent in 2047. As noted above, demographic 
changes are driving much of the increase in federal spending with the remaining increase 
related to rising interest payments on the national debt. The obvious conclusion is that the 
projected expenditure increases in the United States are unsustainable and fiscal restraint is 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/3
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not, however, aim to address whether Congress should prioritize balancing 
the budget over using revenue from wealthy taxpayers to reduce the tax 
burden on others.  
Part I provides a brief background on the social harms of economic 
inequality and the tax system’s limited progressivity. Part II identifies 
several design challenges facing the concept of linking ability to pay tax 
with taxpayers’ wealth. Part III considers how best to respond to these 
challenges and cautiously advances asset-based phase-outs as a modest 
work-around to the constitutional limitations on wealth taxation. Part IV 
discusses the constitutional requirement of apportioning “direct taxes” and 
the potential escape hatches from apportionment.  
I. Economic Inequality and the Tax System  
Since the 1980s, economic inequality in the United States has expanded 
markedly. Economist Thomas Piketty summarizes the lead up to the current 
state of income inequality: 
The top decile claimed as much as 45–50 percent of national 
income in the 1910s-1920s before dropping to 30–35 percent by 
the end of the 1940s. Inequality then stabilized at that level from 
1950 to 1970. We subsequently see a rapid rise in inequality in 
the 1980s, until by 2000 we have returned to a level on the order 
of 45–50 percent of national income.31 
Many have argued that economic inequality harms the economy and 
undermines the potential for a robust and vibrant democracy.
32
  
Economic inequality has been trending upward as a result of two 
overarching mechanisms. First, the government has promoted inequality 
through shaping the rules of the market.
33
 Second, even as the government 
                                                                                                                 
imperative. The United States must reduce the projected level of expenditures and reform its 
tax system to reduce economic distortions and maximize economic growth.”). 
 31. PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 23. 
 32. Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the 
Rest, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-
costs-of-inequality-increasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest/.  
 33. See John Schmitt, Inequality as Policy: The United States Since 1979, CTR. FOR 
ECON. & POL’Y RES. (Oct. 2009), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/inequality-policy-
2009-10.pdf (“Taken together, these policies – a low and falling minimum wage; the de- or 
re-regulation of major industries; the corporate-directed liberalization of international 
capital, product, and labor markets; the privatization of many government services; the 
decline in unionization; and other closely related policies – are the proximate cause of the 
rise in inequality.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
414 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:405 
 
 
fosters inequality in the pre-tax sense, it does less and less to counteract 
inequality through the tax and spending systems.
34
  
A. Harms of Economic Inequality 
Elevated levels of economic inequality inhibit economic output and 
decrease happiness; the rich insulate themselves from the impact, while the 
poor and middle class bear a disproportionate burden.
35
 There is surely no 
set list of dynamics in this process, but several primary phenomena or 
patterns can be identified. A recurring theme is that the rich are different 
from most people in terms of preferences, influence, resources, and ability 
to use self-help to solve problems.
36
  
Political contributions and independent political expenditures are 
concentrated in a very thin slice of the population.
37
 Professor Timothy 
Kuhner explains just how elite this group is: 
In the case of superPACs and dark money groups, where limits 
are weakest, 200 millionaires and billionaires (0.000063 percent 
of the population) stand behind roughly 80 percent of all the 
money spent. In the end, 0.37 percent of the population supplies 
approximately 70 percent of all money in politics.
38
 
Even if spending alone is insufficient to procure a desired outcome, this 
elite group has long enjoyed greater access to politicians,
39
 and legislative 
agendas tend to mirror their concerns.
40
  
                                                                                                                 
 34. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 77. 
 35. Id. at 83. 
 36. Cf. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS 58 (2017) (detailing the ability of the 
upper middle class to maintain their economic position for their children, and thus perpetuate 
“a more rigid class structure than many European nations,” through inheritances, legacy 
preferences in the elite college admissions process, zoning ordinances, and the procurement 
of valuable internship experiences through previously established connections).  
 37. David Weakliem & Robert Biggert, Not Asking for Much: Public Opinion and 
Redistribution from the Rich, 12 COMP. SOC. 66, 67 (2013) (“Money provides political 
advantages even when rights to vote are equal, so affluent people may be able to block or 
weaken measures that threaten their interests even when those measures are popular with the 
public.”). 
 38. TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE 
FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 6 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
 39. See G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? THE TRIUMPH OF THE CORPORATE 
RICH 54-55 (7th ed. 2014) (noting the Bohemian Grove as a place for political Lakeside 
Talks between the upper class, corporate rich, and political hopefuls) (“The retreat 
sometimes provides an occasion for more than fun and merriment. Although business is 
rarely discussed, except in an informal way in groups of two or three, the retreat provides 
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Economic inequality leads to instability, which in turn depresses output. 
Wealth concentration depresses overall demand, leading to unemployment, 
which often cascades into government intervention to spur private 
investment through cheap credit.
41
 Demands for deregulation increase 
risk.
42
 The bubbles in technology startups and in housing are painful 
reminders of the phenomenon.
43
 Inordinate risk from bubbles pushes down 
investment, dampening growth.
44
 Economist Joseph Stiglitz identifies a 
peculiar “irony” of this historical pattern: “while inequality gives rise to 
instability, the instability itself gives rise to more inequality.”45 Then, 
because “the rich are better able to bear risk, they reap the reward that 
society provides for compensating for the greater risk,” notwithstanding 
that they initiated the policies that imposed the risk and its costs on others.
46
  
High inequality produces a myriad of other obstacles to productivity. 
The more wealth becomes concentrated, the less the government invests in 
infrastructure, research, and education.
47
 From state to state in the United 
                                                                                                                 
members with an opportunity to introduce their friends to politicians and to hear formal 
noontime speeches, called Lakeside Talks, from political candidates and a wide range of 
experts.”). 
 40. See KUHNER, supra note 38, at 6; see also DOMHOFF, supra note 39, at 162 (“The 
corporate rich and the power elite build on their structural power, their status power, their 
storehouse of policy recommendations, and their success in the electoral arena to dominate 
the federal government on the issues they care about. Lobbyists from corporations, law 
firms, and trade associations, working through the special-interest process, play a crucial 
role in shaping government policies on narrow issues of concern to wealthy families, 
specific corporations, or business sectors.”).  
 41. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 84; Michael E. Porter & Jan W. Rivkin, A Wake-up Call for 
Tomorrow’s Top 1 Percent: Rebuild America’s Middle Class, FORTUNE (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/a-wake-up-call-for-tomorrows-top-1-percent-rebuild-americas-
middle-class/ (“Weak middle-class prospects undermine the consumer spending on which 
many businesses depend. Workers with marginal or stagnant incomes, and without the skills 
needed to improve them, are less committed and less productive. And a languishing middle 
class fosters disgruntled voters who demand policies that redistribute prosperity rather than 
create it.”). 
 42. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 89; Katherine Bentley, Senior Thesis, The 2008 Financial 
Crisis: How Deregulation Led to the Crisis, LAKE FOREST C. PUBLICATIONS, 27 (2015), 
http://publications.lakeforest.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=seniortheses. 
 43. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 87-89; Bentley, supra note 42, at 4-11 (noting the 
significance of the housing bubble as a contributory factor in the 2008 recession). 
 44. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 91. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 93; JAN W. RIVKIN ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED PROSPERITY 22-23 
(Sept. 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/challenge-of-shared-prosper 
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States, as well as in other countries, economic inequality is associated with 
lower life expectancy, higher crime, increased rates of mental health 
conditions, and other social problems.
48
 This underinvestment occurs 
“despite evidence that the boost these investments give to the economy far 
exceeds the average return in the private sector, and is certainly higher than 
the cost of funds to the government.”49 Decreased educational attainment 
inhibits productivity.
50
 And reduced economic mobility erodes faith in a 
core tenet of democracy.
51
 
Piketty identifies the ability of a small, top-earning managerial class to 
effectively “set their own remuneration” as a key driver of inequality.52 
Their compensation, however, lacks “any clear relation to their individual 
productivity.”53 Similar to the case of the elite managerial returns, Piketty 
suggests that the return from capital is oftentimes “unpredictable and 
arbitrary” and catapulted by the owner’s starting wealth.54 
 In many industries, only a few top performers take most gains.
55
 That is 
not to say that top earners were simply lucky; however, such winner-take-
all markets may yield windfalls to those who could not possibly have 
anticipated their return on effort, while making it difficult for others to 
enter. If the cost of entry into a venture is considerable, and only a few 
investors are likely to profit, some potential inventors and competitors will 
not try.  
                                                                                                                 
ity_95e150dc-b2fd-417f-8c6d-c33a27fd6cb8.pdf (noting that rising inequality led to 
“political polarization and paralysis” and in turn “systemic underinvestment in the 
commons”); Pazzanese, supra note 32.  
 48. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER 
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 19-20 (2009). 
 49. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 93. 
 50. Id. at 94; J. Bradford Delong et al., Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth, in AGENDA 
FOR THE NATION 17, 30 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) (“The slower growth in the 
educational attainment of the work force from 1980 to 2000 shaved productivity growth by 
0.13 percent a year relative to the average for 1915 to 1980.”).  
 51. Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 48, 48 (2008) (“The analyses demonstrate that economic inequality powerfully 
depresses political interest, discussion of politics, and participation in elections among all 
but the most affluent and that this negative effect increases with declining relative income.”)  
 52. PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 24. Piketty finds that similar trends have taken hold 
globally, though except in Britain, the trend is “less marked.” Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 26-27. 
 55. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY 
(1995) (arguing that minor differences in performance lead to enormous differences in 
return, which is an inefficient barrier to entry). 
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Rent-seeking goes hand in hand with inequality. The problem goes 
beyond the potential waste of lobbying expenditures. For example, results 
of rent-seeking include misallocations of resources involving monopolized 
products (such as pharmaceuticals), misallocations of talent into the 
financial sector, and inadequate accounting for environmental and other 
social costs.
56
 Inequality fosters rent-seeking because the wealthy can 
attempt to capture the benefits of rent-seeking while forcing others to bear 
the burdens.
57
 
Finally, subtle effects on productivity and psychological enjoyment may 
be related to perceptions of inequality.
58
 As to productivity, there is 
evidence that workers who feel unfairly compensated tend to be less 
productive.
59
 Regarding psychological enjoyment, the perceived need to 
compete—as it turns out, futilely—for status goods leaves less time for 
family and friends and generally produces unhappiness.
60
 
B. Flattening of the Federal Tax System 
As discussed below, while economic inequality has escalated, the federal 
income tax and estate tax have been reduced from their historical levels. 
The capital gains preference further undermines the progressivity of the 
federal tax system. Meanwhile, the payroll tax adds a regressive element to 
the federal tax system. Capital gains preferences and payroll taxes are not 
new, but at least in the past, highly progressive tax brackets for ordinary 
income, as well as a more robust estate tax, did more to achieve 
progressivity in the overall tax system. 
1. Federal Income Tax  
The federal income tax has changed from a class tax, targeting only rich 
Americans at its inception,
61
 to a mass tax,
62
 drawing in both rich and 
                                                                                                                 
 56. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 95-98. 
 57. Id. at 99 (citing permission and subsidy of offshore drilling as an example of “huge” 
private rewards with dispersed costs for ordinary Americans).  
 58. See Elizabeth Tricomi et al., Neural Evidence for Inequality-Averse Social 
Preferences, 463 NATURE 1089 (2010) (citing prior behavioral and anthropological evidence 
that humans favor reducing inequality and finding “direct neural evidence” of aversion to 
inequality using functional MRI testing). 
 59. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 104. 
 60. Id. at 104-06. 
 61. The Civil War income tax initially was a flat 10% and exempted average households 
from taxation with a personal exemption. See W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on 
U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
TAXING THE RICH 29, 34-35 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). Later, the exemption was reduced 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
418 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:405 
 
 
average Americans. From 1913 until 1980, however, income tax brackets 
penetrated into much higher levels of purchasing power.
63
 Today, the 
brackets level off before $500,000 of income.
64
 As explained below, the 
earlier top brackets were often much higher, especially if converted into 
purchasing power in 2017 dollars.
65
 Platinum brackets recognized that those 
with ultra-high incomes are differently situated from the upper middle class 
or the merely rich.
66
 In addition, multimillion-dollar incomes were 
separately distinguished via the tax brackets at various times.
67
  
In 1913, although there were no platinum brackets, the top rate of 7% 
applied to incomes above $500,000—well over $10 million in present 
value.
68
 Platinum brackets appeared as early as 1917, disappeared after 
World War I, then reappeared in the 1930s.
69
 In the late 1930s and early 
1940s, top brackets penetrated to around $80 million in present value.
70
 
Thus, the federal income tax sharply distinguished among different classes 
of taxpayers, especially when it transformed into a mass tax during World 
War II.
71
 As late as 1963, a 91% rate of tax applied to incomes over $1.5 
million in present value ($200,000 in 1963 dollars).
72
  
                                                                                                                 
and a 5% bracket added. Still, the tax only reached a relatively small proportion of 
households. The tax expired in 1872. The 1894 income tax (ultimately struck down) applied 
a 2% tax, exempting as before most taxpayers with a personal exemption. Likewise, after 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the 1913 income tax exempted most taxpayers. Id. 
at 40-41. 
 62. See id. at 58; Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in 
the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1988). 
 63. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 936-38; SOI Tax Stats – Historical Table 23, IRS 
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/ uac/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-23.  
 64. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (providing 
inflation adjusted tax brackets). 
 65. After 1941, million-dollar brackets superficially disappeared, but nominal top 
brackets of $200,000 to $400,000 in the following decades represent well over $1 million 
when inflated to present value. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 
(Nominal and Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-
nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets [hereinafter U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates 
History]. 
 66. This Article refers to income tax brackets with a threshold of at least $1 million as 
“platinum” brackets. 
 67. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 65. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Brownlee, supra note 61, at 59. 
 72. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 65. 
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Reagan-era tax cuts sharply reduced the progressivity of the income 
tax.
73
 And, for a few years, the tax became almost flat: in 1988, a 15% 
bracket at relatively low incomes and a 28% bracket at middle income 
levels took effect.
74
 In 1990, President George H.W. Bush famously broke 
his anti-tax pledge
75
 by approving a 31% bracket beginning at $82,150 the 
next year.
76
  
President Clinton signed into law two new brackets applying rates of 
36% and 39.6%.
77
 Temporary tax cuts under President George W. Bush 
eliminated the top bracket and reduced the remaining rates.
78
 The latest 
compromise, under President Obama, made the lower brackets permanent 
and revived the 39.6% bracket.
79
  
A progressive income tax with a low rate for capital gains has been 
described as a “ludicrous business of dipping deeply in large incomes with 
a sieve.”80 Most taxpayers have little in the way of investment income and 
essentially see their wages taxed at ordinary rates. In 2010, capital gains 
and dividends taxed at special rates comprised a mere 1% of the income of 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Alice Gresham Bullock, The Tax Code, the Tax Gap, and Income Inequality: The 
Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249, 256-57 (2010). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Meg Fowler, From Eisenhower to Obama: What the Wealthiest Americans Pay 
in Taxes, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.yahoo.com/news/eisenhower-obama-
wealthiest-americans-pay-taxes-193734550--abc-news.html (noting the “famed promise of 
‘no new taxes’”). 
 76. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Bruce Bartlett, Time for a Tax 
Reform, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/02/time-tax-reform-
opinions-columnists-overdue.html. 
 77. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 78. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 
108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 79. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 80. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 219 (1938); see also Charles J. Cooper et al., The Legal 
Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a Regulation Providing for 
Indexation of Capital Gains, 12 VA. TAX REV. 631 (1993); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the 
Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477 (2009); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The 
Morality Of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 
119 (1994); John W. Lee, III, The Capital Gains “Sieve” and the “Farce” of Progressivity 
1921-1986, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
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taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) below $50,000.
81
 But upper-
middle class taxpayers (and especially the wealthiest taxpayers) make 
substantial investments in property. The top 1% is different from all other 
groups in that capital income, such as capital gains, makes up a majority of 
their income.
82
 
Investments in property can benefit from many tax preferences. As 
explained below, some of the most important are the realization rule, the 
step-up in basis for heirs who inherit property, and the preferential tax rates 
applicable to net long-term capital gains. The capital gains preference has 
been almost a constant in modern tax history.
83
 Today, the highest rate on 
most long-term capital gains is 20%, just under half the highest rate 
applicable to ordinary income. The recent tax on net investment income 
adds another 3.8%.
84
 
There are legitimate reasons for special treatment of certain capital gains. 
Among the hodgepodge of rationales that are often cited for the capital 
gains preference, the most compelling is that it helps neutralize the effects 
of inflation and bunching of income accrued over many years into one 
taxable period.
85
 The importance of inflation is the understatement of basis 
and the taxation of nominal gains. Bunching, on the other hand, could 
possibly push a taxpayer into a higher tax bracket for the year of the gain 
realization.  
Taxing capital gains accurately may also require inflation adjustments to 
basis.
86
 Because the income tax does not index cost basis, the capital gains 
preference can be rationalized to a limited extent as roughly making good 
on that failure. But the capital gains preference is poorly tailored to 
implement that rationale. The preference is triggered after owning an asset 
for a year and a day and does not depend on the taxpayer having a 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2010, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., 
Fall 2012, at 5, 10 fig.F, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12infallbulincome.pdf. 
 82. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
FEDERAL TAXES, 2011, at 5 (2014) (finding that labor income made up at least two-thirds of 
market income for each quintile though the share “falls off significantly for households in 
the top 1 percent of the distribution”). 
 83. Before 1921 and from 1988-1991, there was no preference. 
 84. See Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 
1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060-62 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411). 
 85. See Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 186 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting 
importance of “appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time” and 
“‘bunching’ effect”). 
 86. See generally Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 
537 (1993). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/3
2018]        IMPROVING TAX RULES BY MEANS-TESTING 421 
 
 
significant tax basis.
87
 Further complicating reform of the taxation of capital 
gains is the corporate income tax, the burden of which may be borne by 
shareholders or shifted to labor.
88
 
The realization rule has always been a basic principle of the federal 
income tax. Although the normative tax base would theoretically include 
changes in wealth during the year, tax generally is triggered only upon a 
sale or other disposition of property. This deferral allows investors to 
radically reduce, or even eliminate, tax on their gains in property. Because 
the ownership of property is so concentrated, the benefits of deferral are 
quite regressively distributed. By one estimate, $2 or $3 trillion in 
unrealized gains are excluded from tax.
89
 
Although U.S. citizens and corporations pay tax on their worldwide 
income, there are ample opportunities for the U.S. owners of foreign 
corporations to avoid U.S. tax on foreign income.
90
 In general, the foreign 
income of foreign corporations beneficially owned by Americans remains 
outside the U.S. tax net, subject to certain anti-deferral regimes. 
Consequently, income can generally be deferred until repatriation in the 
form of a dividend. The received wisdom is that repatriation will not be 
forthcoming, because owners would hope for a tax holiday reducing or 
eliminating the tax rate on such income.  
Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a “step-up”91 in 
basis for inherited property. In other words, the decedent’s heirs or devisees 
take the property with a basis equal to the property’s fair market value.92 
With basis equal to fair market value, if the new owner immediately cashes 
out, no gain or loss is recognized. Or, if the heir waits until later to sell, 
only the appreciation in the property after the decedent’s death will be 
taxed. Thus, neither the decedent nor the heirs pay tax on any appreciation 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2012). 
 88. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 89. See ARTHUR B. LAFFER & STEPHEN MOORE, RETURN TO PROSPERITY: HOW AMERICA 
CAN REGAIN ITS ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER STATUS 183 (2011). 
 90. See JOINT COMM. TAX’N STAFF, 112TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES 
RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN 
BUSINESS INCOME 2-7 (2011), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id= 
3793. 
 91. Technically, the basis can “step-down” if fair market value is lower. 
 92. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012); see also Richard Schmalbeck et al., Advocating a 
Carryover Tax Basis Regime, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 
3). 
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between the decedent’s basis and fair market value at the time of the 
decedent’s death.93  
Thus, from a historical perspective, today’s tax rates are not particularly 
high, nor do the brackets do much to distinguish the very rich from the rest 
of the population. The rich are taxed as if they were upper-middle class, but 
because they may realize the bulk of their income as capital gains, they may 
effectively be taxed at much lower rates.
94
 Moreover, such gains may be 
deferred or even eliminated if the owner holds the property until death. 
2. Other Federal Taxes 
The payroll tax was enacted in 1935 to fund Social Security benefits.
95
 
As explained below, despite the appearance of a benefit scheme, it makes 
sense to conceive of the program as a tax with two strongly regressive 
design features. First, the payroll tax is a flat rate of 7.65% on the employer 
and employee with a wage cap currently set at $127,200.
96
 Second, the 
payroll tax base does not include investment income.
97
 This exclusion 
constitutes another regressive feature because those with wealth to invest 
have greater ability to pay than those with equal wage income.
98
 
                                                                                                                 
 93. There is a misconception that section 1014 is meant to eliminate double taxation. 
See, e.g., Janis v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the “rule avoids 
a double tax on the appreciation in the value of the property that occurred prior to death”). 
Section 1014 can hurt the decedent’s heirs when the estate tax applies, if it results in a “step-
down.” Section 1014 may help the decedent’s heirs even when the estate tax does not apply, 
because the “step-up” is not conditioned on estate tax liability.  
 94. See Joseph D. Henchman & Christopher L. Stephens, Playing Fair: Distribution, 
Economic Growth, and Fairness in Federal and State Tax Debates, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
89, 101 (2014) (“Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway . . . famously complained that 
it was unfair that he pays a lower percentage of his income in federal taxes than his 
secretary.”); McMahon, supra note 20, at 1005 (“[I]ncomes of the members of this club [the 
Fortunate 400] consist largely of capital gains—over 70% of the group’s total AGI in each 
of 1998, 1999, and 2000 was net capital gains.”).  
 95. See generally C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM (1994); Wilbur J. 
Cohen, The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years 
Later, 68 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1983). 
 96. See Contribution and Benefit Base, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ 
oact/cola/cbb.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).  
 97. A 3.8% surcharge on net investment income for taxpayers with income over 
$200,000 was enacted in 2010 to help fund Medicare. See Healthcare and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060-62 
(2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411). 
 98. See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
113, 130 n.98 (2014) (“Of course, the low-income investor has wealth, which the low-
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Like the income tax, “[t]he payroll tax affects too many people and raises 
too much revenue to remain outside the core debate about tax fairness.”99 
The fairness debate concerns both the need for fair distinctions between the 
rich and others as well as unfair distinctions between laborers and investors 
with the same income. Because of the regressive nature of the payroll tax, 
“[i]f the tax system’s treatment of retirement savings is analyzed along with 
the Social Security system, the combined system reveals ‘a far less 
redistributive, and thus less justice-enhancing, national retirement security 
program than emerges from looking at Social Security benefits alone.’”100  
Without embracing a benefits model of taxation, Professor Sugin argues 
that Social Security differs importantly from a market: 
If payroll taxes “buy” retirement security, the price is arbitrary, 
depending on numerous factors including lifespan, income, and 
marital status. Early participants in the program received 
significantly more in retirement benefits than they had paid in 
taxes. In contrast, Social Security is a bad “investment” for 
numerous workers today because many individuals retiring now 
paid more in Social Security taxes than they will receive in 
retirement benefits. . . . Some groups, like non-working spouses 
of high-income taxpayers who receive widow benefits have 
disproportionally benefitted under the scheme. Others, black 
men in particular, do not live long enough to collect a fair share 
of benefits compared to taxes paid. . . . [T]he amount of tax that 
pays for credits . . . . differs for high and low-income taxpayers, 
and has changed over time.
101
 
Accordingly, Social Security more resembles a tax than a fee and should 
not be walled off from broader discussions of tax equity. 
Anticipating the potential objection that the fee should simply be 
recalibrated, Professor Sugin suggests that if the benefits theory of taxation 
has a place, it is for concrete, determinable benefits.
102
 The value of Social 
Security benefits, however, is arguably too indeterminate to fit the model.
103
 
                                                                                                                 
income wage earner eligible for the credits does not, so the very low-income investor is 
likely to be substantially better off financially than the very low-income worker.”). 
 99. Id. at 115. 
 100. Id. at 115 n.9 (quoting Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement 
Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 873 (1987)). 
 101. See id. at 136 (footnotes omitted). 
 102. See id. at 137. 
 103. See id. Professor Sugin outlines the reasons behind the indeterminacy as follows: 
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The estate tax could theoretically compensate for distributional 
shortcomings of the income tax and the payroll tax. Estate tax repeal, 
however, has proven surprisingly popular.
104
 Very few families would 
receive the bulk of the benefits of repeal.
105
 Tales of disaster about the 
breakup of family farms and small businesses, though apocryphal, 
presumably have led to the unpopularity of the tax.
106
 
From 1935 to 1971, the top estate tax rate stood at 70% or 77%.
107
 The 
top bracket threshold was millions higher than the $1 million top bracket 
today, even without adjustment for inflation.
108
 As late as the 1990s, less 
                                                                                                                 
In the case of Social Security retirement, the “price” for benefits must be paid 
many years prior to the receipt of benefits. Is the benefit the actual amount of 
Social Security received over a lifetime, or is the benefit the security of a 
steady income until death, regardless of the actual amount paid out? These 
valuation problems arise in determining the right levy for payroll taxes under a 
benefits tax scheme, and using the tax’s flat rate as a percentage of wages up to 
a cap is problematic at best. 
Id. 
 104. Michael J. Graetz, “Death Tax” Politics, 57 B.C. L. REV. 801, 813 (2016) (“The 
temporary estate tax repeal in 2010 and that year’s political deal ratify the much broader 
success of a conservative Republican wing that has been attacking progressive taxation and 
pushing its anti-tax agenda over the past three decades. Neither the fight over the estate tax, 
nor the larger debate about progressive taxation, is anywhere close to being over.”); see also 
Weakliem & Biggert, supra note 37, at 69 (“[A] 2008 CBS News/New York Times survey 
noted that the estate tax applied only to estates of over 3.5 million dollars and followed by 
asking respondents which statement came closer to their own view: ‘there should be no tax 
on any estate’ or ‘the estate tax should be eliminated for most people, but kept in place for 
the very largest estates.’ Opinions were evenly divided, with 44% in favor of complete 
elimination and 47% in favor of keeping it for the largest estates; only 4% volunteered that 
the tax should be kept as it is or applied more widely.”). 
 105. See Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, IRS 
STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 124-25, 128, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/ninetyestate.pdf (providing brief history of estate tax and graphing the “small fraction of 
estates” that have paid the tax). 
 106. See Glenn Kessler, Is the Estate Tax Killing Small Farms and Businesses?, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/14/ 
the-facts-about-the-estate-tax-and-farmers; Misperceptions on Estate Tax Detracting from 
Worthwhile Revenues for United States, RUTGERS BUS. SCH. (May 25, 2011), http://www.bus 
iness.rutgers.edu/business-insights/misperceptions-estate-tax-detracting-worthwhile-revenues-
united-states (“People often complain that family businesses or family farms have to be sold to 
meet the estate tax, but in 2001 when Congress held hearings on repealing the tax, they were 
hard pressed to find any farms or businesses that were forced to liquidate because of it.”) 
(quoting Professor Jay Soled). 
 107. See Jacobson et al., supra note 105, at 122.  
 108. See id. at 122, 124. 
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staggering estates were subject to the estate tax, and the rate maxed out at 
55%. The exemption amount stood at $675,000 before the Bush tax cuts.
109
 
Currently only multimillion-dollar estates are subject to the tax and at a rate 
of 40%.
110
 With an exemption amount of over $5 million (over $10 million 
for a married couple), very few estates are subject to the tax. Whether the 
estate tax results in substantial revenue collection from those to whom it 
would seem likely to apply is another question. It is no secret that the rich 
often engage in aggressive estate tax planning.
111
 Some argue that the rules 
effectively require taxpayers to bear a significant amount of economic risk 
to achieve aggressive estate tax planning goals.
112
 
In sum, although the models and estimates vary, the federal tax system is 
much less progressive than most would imagine.
113
 Although this Article 
does not attempt to specify the ideal level of progressivity in the system, it 
proceeds on the assumption that substantially more progressivity is 
desirable.  
II. Challenges of Linking Wealth Inequality 
with “Ability to Pay” Income Tax 
A host of substantial challenges, ranging from theoretical to practical, 
stand between wealth and the income tax. This Part first seeks to identify 
the tax justice theories that would bring legitimacy to progressive income 
taxation, wealth taxation, and by extension addressing wealth in the income 
tax. This preliminary step seems in order given the conceptual disconnect 
between wealth and income and the growing scholarly movement to 
address tax equity.
114
 After grappling with these theoretical problems, the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See id. at 122. 
 110. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012). 
 111. See Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap, supra note 18, at 154; see also supra 
note 18 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap, supra note 18, at 162. 
 113. See JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32693, DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE TAX BURDEN ACROSS INDIVIDUALS: AN OVERVIEW (2010); Average Effective Federal Tax 
Rates – All Tax Units, by Expanded Cash Income Level, 2016, TAX POL’Y CTR.(Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/baseline-average-effective-tax-rates-march-
2017/t17-0039-average-effective-federal. 
 114. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax 
Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) (“Tax policy has ignored the necessity of first 
identifying equity goals appropriate for a just government and then designing a tax system to 
help achieve those goals.”); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax 
Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 231 (2011) (arguing for “a nuanced, philosophical 
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discussion anticipates concerns relating to public support for the policy 
change, potential economic distortions that might follow, and 
administrative difficulties.  
A. The Protean Nature of “Ability to Pay” 
As indicated in the introduction,
115
 this Article has highlighted ability to 
pay because of its longstanding importance as a tax policy norm.
116
 Even 
those who discount it feel compelled to engage with it.
117
 Ability to pay 
falls under a broader principle of fair sacrifice. The benefit principle could 
be characterized as perhaps the chief rival theory of tax justice at this 
time.
118
 There are, to be sure, other theories of tax justice, such as 
libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and social welfarism.
119
 
This Article will not dwell long on the benefits principle, however, given 
that the weight of scholarship has moved on in favor other theories. As 
Professor Deborah Schenk writes, “[t]he benefits principle posits that 
government expenses should be allocated in proportion to the benefits 
                                                                                                                 
understanding of fairness that incorporates the role of taxation into a broader conception of a 
just society”). 
 115. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Sugin, supra note 114, at 248 (“Proponents of equality in taxation must consider 
how best to incorporate the complexities of measuring valuation and productivity into the 
standard analyses of ability to pay and equal sacrifice.”). This shorthand is also standard fare 
in textbooks. See, e.g., JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFERY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL TAXATION 3 (3d ed. 2013) (“[A] system should levy taxes commensurately with 
one’s ability to pay those taxes. It is generally thought that incomes taxes and consumption 
taxes are best on this count.”). 
 117. See Buehler, supra note 15, at 244 (recounting Buehler’s participation in a National 
Tax Association “round table of economists, tax administrators, and others,” some of whom 
“denounced” the phrase, and that “after heated controversy it was apparent that ability to pay 
still possessed much vigor, that it had many ardent supporters, and that it was not yet ready 
for burial”); Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 310-11 
(2000); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 
459 n.173 (2000).  
 118. See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 310 (“The chief rival (or back-up) to the benefit 
principle as a standard for apportioning the cost of public goods has been the fair sacrifice 
principle.”); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1133-34 (describing benefits principles and ability to 
pay); Schenk, supra note 117, at 458 (“Rejection of the benefits principle as a means of 
allocating the cost of public goods usually leads to consideration of fair sacrifice 
principles.”). 
 119. See Barbara H. Fried, Compared to What? Taxing Brute Luck and Other Second-
Best Problems, 53 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (2000); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1134; Sugin, 
supra note 114, at 239. 
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received.”120 Professor Schenk then identifies difficult computational 
questions that “make[] it clear that this is not a workable approach.”121 That 
being said, the benefits principle is usually taken to counsel in favor of a 
head tax rather than a progressive tax system of any kind.
122
  
Even the opponents of wealth taxation concede that the application of 
benefits principles is “difficult” and “our intuitions . . . offer only shaky 
guidance.”123 Professor Rakowski presents (and rejects) two plausible 
benefits rationales for wealth taxation. First, “insofar as the state’s 
protective benefits are limited to worldly goods, one might think that it 
makes sense for the tax to vary with the value of those goods, just as the 
cost of insuring them does.”124 Second, “the rich evidently benefit most 
from economic activity in quantitative material terms and that, speaking 
very generally, economic flourishing depends on a nation’s security and its 
suppression of criminal activity.”125 In sum, reasonable minds could differ 
about how to apply benefits principles to wealth taxation, given the 
apparent difficulty of apportionment of costs. 
It is probably fair to say that ability to pay, along with other fair sacrifice 
principles, has dominated other plausible tax justice norms.
126
 Yet this leads 
to difficult questions concerning what these principles mean. Fair sacrifice 
principles standing alone do not point to a specific tax base.
127
 More 
generally, “the burden of supplying public goods should be allocated 
among citizens based not on what each receives, but rather on what 
constitutes a fair contribution.”128 
Economist Nicholas Kaldor is often cited for the proposition that “[o]nly 
a combination of income and property taxes can give an approximation to 
taxation in accordance with ability to pay.”129 Other scholars have 
elaborated on the notion that wealth affords benefits in addition to future 
consumption: 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Schenk, supra note 117, at 458. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Rakowski, supra note 117, at 304; Schenk, supra note 117, at 458.  
 123. Rakowski, supra note 117, at 303. 
 124. Id. at 306. 
 125. Id. at 308. 
 126. See supra notes 3, 117, and accompanying text. 
 127. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 458.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 365 (alteration in original) (quoting NICHOLAS 
KALDOR, INDIAN TAX REFORM: REPORT OF A SURVEY (1956), reprinted in NICHOLAS 
KALDOR, REPORTS ON TAXATION II, at 31, 58 (1980)). 
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[W]ealth confers political power, social power, peace of mind, 
independence, security and, at least in early 21st century United 
States, great prestige. The power to direct investment of savings 
to private, rather than public ends, is a further benefit. For some, 
wealth may not even represent future consumption; 
accumulation may be an end in itself.
130
  
Professor Repetti echoes these themes, albeit in setting forth a different 
theory of tax justice that supports wealth taxation: “Persons with greater 
wealth have more to invest and thus can exercise greater control. . . . [T]he 
selection of investments can exert great influence.”131  
The typical fairness objections to wealth taxation include that it would be 
unfair to savers or would unfairly exclude human capital.
132
 Professor 
Schenk persuasively argues that allowing “time preferences” to override the 
choice of tax base is putting the “cart before the horse.”133 Professor Schenk 
also offers a rejoinder to the human capital objection: that including such 
capital would represent “a significant loss of freedom” and that “it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure human capital accurately.”134 Human 
capital exclusion from wealth could also make sense as a rough adjustment 
in keeping with the perspective of Professors Lily Kahng and Mary Louise 
Fellows. In their view, workers are systematically denied deductions for 
expenses that contribute to intellectual capital or the production of income 
and should be at least in part recoverable.
135
  
Scholars generally invoke the diminishing marginal utility of money to 
justify a progressive tax system.
136
 In addition, some have argued that 
winner-take-all markets buttress this case.
137
 However, assumptions about 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Schenk, supra note 117, at 463-65 (footnotes omitted). 
 131. See Repetti, supra note 114, at 1162. 
 132. See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 365-66; Schenk, supra note 117, at 465. 
 133. Schenk, supra note 117, at 461-62. 
 134. Id. at 466. 
 135. See generally Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed 
Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013); Lily Kahng, 
Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 607 (2017).  
 136. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax 
Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011) (explaining and critiquing this analytical move).  
 137. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing 
the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 79 (1998) (“When income is 
distributed in the manner typical of winner-take-all markets, even conservative assumptions 
about the rate at which the marginal utility of money declines make it simple to show that a 
system of progressive taxation can result in greater aggregate utility, and therefore greater 
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declining utility may be overstated or inaccurate.
138
 It may be more 
intellectually honest to stipulate that egalitarian theories of justice or other 
rationales for redistribution underlie the choice of a progressive tax 
system.
139
  
Thus, ability to pay, at a superficial level, relates to the available 
resources of the taxpayer, but, at a deeper level, it is a heuristic for a milieu 
of policy considerations behind the implementation of a progressive income 
tax.
140
 Redistributive “theories fall into two groups: those that equalize 
opportunity or resources and those that equalize welfare or outcomes.”141 
Moreover, any plausible theory of distributive justice must account for the 
importance of luck, talent, and beginning inequality.
142
 And all these 
considerations could be addressed by some form of taxing wealth.
143
 
Professor Repetti distinguishes ability to pay and argues that “the 
underlying goal of distributive justice in a democracy is to establish 
conditions that will provide equal opportunity for all to participate, [so] the 
government’s tax system should be designed to impose a burden on the 
taxpayer’s ability to exert disproportionate influence on the political 
process.”144 Another potential refinement of ability to pay is Professor 
Deborah Geier’s concept of “income available for discretionary use.”145 
                                                                                                                 
efficiency, than a system of proportional taxation. In other words, the old equity/efficiency 
trade-off need not be made. We can have both.”). 
 138. See Lawsky, supra note 136, at 914. 
 139. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 519–20 (1952); Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven 
at 50: Progressive Taxation, “Globalization,” and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 
731, 745–46 (2000) (“The alternate arguments—diminishing marginal utility of money, the 
benefit theory and the breakup of large concentrations of wealth—were dubious even in 
Blum and Kalven’s day, and intermediate developments have if anything weakened these 
further. . . . There is no escaping the redistributive or fairness issue.”). 
 140. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 30 (4th ed. 2002); LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 12–13 (2002); 
Blum & Kalven, supra note 139, at 519–20. 
 141. Schenk, supra note 117, at 471. 
 142. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 140, at 33.  
 143. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 471-72. 
 144. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1160. 
 145. Deborah A. Geier, The Taxation of Income Available for Discretionary Use, 25 VA. 
TAX REV. 765, 765 (2006). 
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Either of these perspectives, however, would appear to accommodate 
wealth taxation quite comfortably.
146
 
B. Public Opinion on Economic Inequality and Taxation 
Tax reform need not be chained to popular conceptions of ideal tax 
policy, but public opinion is relevant as a source of inspiration and a gauge 
of the relative plausibility of policy options and the likely critiques that will 
resonate politically. Recent work exploring American opinions on 
inequality and taxation find a complicated set of beliefs. These attitudes 
would seem to offer both pitfalls and opportunities for progressive tax 
reform. 
In The Undeserving Rich, Professor Leslie McCall examines public 
opinion data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National 
Election Studies, as well as from historical and theoretical sources, to 
explain American attitudes about inequality and redistribution.
147
 
Importantly, Americans have consistently shown strong concern about 
economic inequality as well as the relationship between inequality and 
opportunity.
148
 Professor McCall notes that prior work has generated overly 
simplistic conclusions about Americans’ views of inequality—these could 
be labeled tolerance, ambivalence, or ignorance.
149
  
None of these prior perspectives would seem to offer particularly helpful 
prescriptions for proponents of progressive income taxation. The 
“tolerance” and “ignorance” accounts might foreshadow futility or a 
herculean effort to reduce bias. If “ambivalence” is the correct story, it most 
likely leaves space for elites to shape the course.
150
  
Professor McCall’s examination, in contrast, finds that Americans have 
consistently been concerned about economic inequality and want the 
government to do more to solve the problem.
151
 Although it may be more of 
an exception than the rule, the perception of inequitable market rewards for 
labor seems to nudge the population toward intolerance of inequality and 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See id. at 768, 824 (including “large gratuitous receipts” in the tax base and 
contemplating a wealth tax); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1162 (suggesting wealth and/or 
income as the tax base to burden a person’s ability to exert political influence). 
 147. LESLIE MCCALL, THE UNDESERVING RICH 13-18 (2013). 
 148. Id. at 37 (“Americans are skeptical of the availability of true equality of opportunity 
and disapprove of existing levels of inequality . . . .”). 
 149. Id. at 28-50. 
 150. Id. at 217 (positing that policy ambivalence represents confusion rather than 
ignorance or hostility and a “need for public elites to lead the way”).  
 151. Id. at 189 (“Americans do increasingly object to inequality, and those who do so 
also believe government should act to redress it . . . .”). 
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indirectly toward a desire for redistributive policies. Regardless of that 
tendency, a clear majority of the population has long answered that those 
with high incomes should pay a larger or much larger share of their 
incomes in taxes.
152
 This pairs oddly with results since 1992, indicating less 
than a majority answered that taxes for those with high incomes are too low 
or much too low.
153
 
According to Professor McCall’s account, prior research had also failed 
to connect beliefs about inequality to beliefs about opportunity. Professor 
McCall’s nuanced findings portray an America that is concerned about 
inequality and how it connects with equality of opportunity. Although 
Americans consistently show that they believe strongly in “bootstraps” 
opportunity, this does not seem to correlate with their attitude toward 
economic inequality. Unlike in Europe, luck does not seem to enter much 
into the equation in American attitudes toward economic inequality.
154
 The 
American view of equality of opportunity, however, appears somewhat 
paradoxically linked with whether equitable outcomes flow from those 
opportunities.
155
 
Even if Americans are concerned about inequality, and even if they 
believe that it harms equal opportunity, this might not lead to support for 
strongly redistributive tax policy.
156
 These beliefs could be compatible with 
regulation of compensation or other nontax solutions.
157
 Dramatic changes 
to top tax rates would appear at odds with prevailing attitudes. 
Combining Professor McCall’s insights with a more anecdotal approach 
yields relatively greater hope for progressive tax reform that can be 
packaged as closing loopholes or forcing the rich to pay their fair share 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 198. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 30 (“Americans have been indoctrinated by economic and political elites to 
believe that effort is fairly rewarded and government redistribution is unnecessary. 
Europeans have been swayed by powerful socialist and labor movements to believe that luck 
determines the class into which one is born and likely to stay, necessitating a compensatory 
system of social support.”). But see Weakliem & Biggert, supra note 37, at 85 (“The most 
recent question, from a 2008 Pew survey, finds that more people ascribe wealth to social 
background than to ‘hard work, ambition, or education.’”). 
 155. MCCALL, supra note 147, at 37 (“Americans are skeptical of the availability of true 
equality of opportunity and disapprove of existing levels of inequality, yet support for the 
free market in principle is strong. The rich deserve to be well compensated for their hard 
work and contributions to society, yet many of them are overpaid.”).  
 156. Id. at 189. 
 157. Id. (“The evidence suggests that Americans may be unsure or uninformed about 
how to address rising inequality and thus are swayed by contemporaneous debates and 
portrayals of the issue in the media.”). 
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relative to a current baseline. As Vanessa Williamson chronicles in Read 
My Lips, survey respondents consistently believe that the rich do not pay 
their fair share and inappropriately take advantage of loopholes.
158
 The 
respondents tend to equate loopholes with deductions.
159
 There seems to be 
no necessary contradiction between these anecdotes and the GSS 
respondents—the GSS question could be perceived as more of a question 
about the law whereas a free response opportunity allows respondents to 
explore the compliance reality. Perhaps the underlying rationale behind the 
GSS data mined by Professor McCall is that if the rich paid taxes at an 
effective rate close to that in the tax tables, then their tax burden would not 
be too low.  
This important work on American opinions toward tax and inequality 
does not suggest that the most aggressive and salient income tax measures 
to combat inequality—such as radically increased tax rates for the rich—are 
nonstarters. Yet they do suggest support for measures that would bring the 
effective tax rate for rich individuals closer to the rates suggested by the tax 
tables. That may not mean just closing “loopholes. The public may much 
more readily support mark-to-market or ending step-up at death than more 
progressive tax brackets.  
This is not to say that even closing loopholes—or securing similar tax 
law changes—would be easy politically. It also does not mean that changes 
to the top tax bracket are out of the question. It may become even more 
feasible if American attitudes about the role of luck toward economic 
inequality were to become more like those in Europe. Given the difficulty 
of securing tax reform of any kind, to say nothing of progressive tax 
changes, it seems beneficial to explore changes that do not involve the top 
tax bracket. Moreover, some of these changes could dramatically increase 
the tax paid by the wealthy.  
It is, to be sure, a jump from “closing loopholes” to the pursuit of asset-
based phase-outs set forth in Section III.C. Survey respondents would not 
                                                                                                                 
 158. VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS 130-31 (2017) (“In 2011, when the Pew 
Research Center asked Americans what bothered them most about taxes, 57 percent said ‘the 
feeling that some wealthy people get away not paying their fair share’ . . . . This belief, my 
interviews reveal, is reinforced by an income-tax filing process that encourages people to 
imagine that the wealthy are getting a special deal, and in particular, to see loopholes (rather 
than historically low top marginal rates) as the reason why rich people can avoid paying 
much in taxes.”); see also Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., (Jul. 2011), 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8209-f.pdf (showing that a 
majority of those polled believed that “[c]losing tax loopholes for wealthy Americans” 
would reduce the federal budget deficit). 
 159. WILLIAMSON, supra note 158, at 132-33.  
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necessarily support or understand this concept. To my knowledge, there 
have been no studies on American opinions towards tax phase-outs. Clear 
public opposition towards means-testing of Social Security and Medicare 
are distinguishable because of the prevailing benefit program logic with 
respect to those programs.
160
 
 In sum, means-testing or phase-outs, as a framing device, could be 
helpful in presenting progressive tax policies. Means-testing has become a 
familiar conservative refrain with respect to even the most popular 
government entitlements, Social Security and Medicare. Means-testing may 
be the frame that goes precisely between the extreme of doing nothing—
i.e., relying on the market to fix salaries—and measures that single out the 
rich for perceived “penalties” such as platinum tax brackets. 
C. Phase-Outs and Cliffs Create Tax Rate Bubbles 
The scholarly reception to phase-outs ranges from firm opposition at 
worst
161
 to cautious intrigue at best.
162
 Proponents of phase-outs point to the 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Look to Wealthy to Help Save Social Security, 
GALLUP (Jul. 29, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141611/americans-look-wealthy-help-
save-social-security.aspx; see also Rick Blizzard, Who Supports Medicare Means Testing?, 
GALLUP (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9733/who-supports-medicare-means-
testing.aspx (“But despite the divisive nature of public opinion on Medicare means testing, it 
is easy to understand why legislators continue to revisit it. What will be the cost of providing 
the same Medicare access for all seniors? The aging baby boomer generation will soon be 
eligible for Medicare, and as life expectancy increases, this group will be collecting 
Medicare longer. This bubble will dramatically increase the overall cost of Medicare.”). 
 161. See generally Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: “Phasing-Out” Tax 
Allowances Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505 (1987); Edward 
J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1898-1901 (1994); Daniel 
Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).  
 162. See Samuel D. Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Tax Gap, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 139, 161 (2013) (“[T]o promote vertical equity and to prevent the government from 
losing too much revenue, the [proposed] exclusion should phase out as a shareholder’s 
income increases.”); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 
VA. TAX REV. 645, 731-32 (2003) (“Ultimately, however, phaseouts can be an effective 
means to enhance vertical equity at a relatively low revenue cost.”); David M. Schizer, 
Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 334 (2015) (stating that phase-outs “permit 
precise income-based allocations. . . . focus[ing] the subsidy where it does the most good” 
with the “main disadvantage [being] that phase-outs and cliffs increase effective marginal 
rates”). 
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ability to target benefits to those who need them, a distributive advantage in 
improving vertical equity.
163
  
The principal trade-off of a phase-out is an effective marginal rate 
“bubble.” This means that the marginal tax cost of additional income 
temporarily rises above the rate specified in the tax brackets due to a tax 
benefit being clawed back, before falling back in line with the brackets 
once the phase-out is complete.
164
 Phase-outs of tax benefits are often, as 
Professor McCaffery puts it, “in fact changes in the rates because there is a 
straight-forward relationship between rates and base-definition.”165 Turning 
this on its head, Professor McCaffery cautions that phase-outs may be 
“rather incoherent if one attempted to defend them as matters of base 
definition.”166 All other things being equal, it would seem undesirable for 
“marginal rates to bounce up and down for no apparent reason.”167  
While policymakers and scholars typically cite cost savings,
168
 others 
have been sharply critical of the cost savings logic. As Professor Shaviro 
has argued, “Eliminating the phaseout on a revenue-neutral basis would 
simply mean that some taxpayers’ marginal tax rates would drop while 
others’ would increase, permitting implementation of a rate structure that 
might make more sense overall.”169 And as Professor McCaffery states:  
In the case of the phase-outs and the like, Congress is legislating 
that people at certain income ranges should pay a higher 
percentage of their incomes in taxes, without regard to the 
sources of that income. That is, there is no principled decision 
that certain kinds of “income,” or uses thereof, should be favored 
or not, only that certain levels of income should bear higher 
burdens—this is essentially a decision about tax rates. This point 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Brunson, supra note 162, at 180-81 (proposing phase-out of a proposed tax rule 
in the interest of vertical equity and limiting revenue loss); Donaldson, supra note 162, at 
724, 731-32; Schizer, supra note 162, at 334 (“Phase-outs and cliffs offer a familiar trade-off 
between programmatic benefits and distribution, on one hand, and excess burden, on the 
other. These limits permit precise income-based allocations. This can focus the subsidy 
where it does the most good, especially when subsidies generate private benefits.”). 
 164. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409 (criticizing this effect). 
 165. McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1900. 
 166. Id. at 1900-01 (citing the dependency deduction and “increased marriage penalties 
among the wealthy . . . [that] also have the unfortunate effect of aggravating a bias against 
secondary earners”).  
 167. See Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409. 
 168. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 162, at 181. 
 169. Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409. 
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is most obviously seen in the case of the surcharge or 
“bubble.”170 
Moreover, phase-outs increase the complexity of the tax system. By 
Professor Donaldson’s count some years ago, the Code contained nearly 
twenty phase-out provisions.
171
 Professor Donaldson, however, argued 
against rejecting phase-outs solely because of complexity at the same time 
as he criticized the “deceitful” use of phase-outs, particularly in the 1986 
tax reform packaged as a tax cut.
172
 Indeed, phase-outs can seem like 
“gimmicks” if their true purpose is simply an across-the-board tax rate 
increase.
173
  
On balance, the considerations weighing against phase-outs merit 
thoughtful consideration, even for one who cares deeply about the 
distributive potential for phase-outs. But phase-outs are not monolithic. 
Asset-based phase-outs raise distinct concerns and potential benefits.
174
  
D. Potential Distortions from High Marginal Tax Rates 
Some may accept the premise that economic inequality is costly yet 
contest that increasing taxes on the wealthy would be a wise solution. An 
important theme of the tax literature involves balancing the perceived utility 
gains from redistribution with the potential losses from distortions that may 
be caused by high marginal tax rates. This “optimal tax” literature is often 
cited for the proposition that high marginal rates at high incomes will 
reduce total welfare because taxpayers may substitute leisure if work 
provides less of a reward. This “substitution effect” is the possibility that 
opponents of high marginal tax rates point to, while omitting an offsetting 
income effect.  
The received wisdom was that an optimal tax would only reach labor and 
at a relatively low rate; a fixed cash grant would generate modestly 
increasing average tax rates.
175
 There is another related debate about 
whether a (progressive) consumption tax should replace, or at least 
                                                                                                                 
 170. McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1900. 
 171. See Donaldson, supra note 162, at 722 n.376.  
 172. Id. at 731-32. 
 173. See id. at 725 n.395 (citing Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and 
Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 92 TAX NOTES 1415, 1433-34 (2001); see also 
McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1899. 
 174. See infra Section III.C. 
 175. McMahon, supra note 20, at 1077-78; Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of 
Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 547 (2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
436 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:405 
 
 
supplement, the income tax.
176
 Scholars have, however, disputed or varied 
the assumptions of the optimal tax literature, as well as the implications of 
those assumptions.
177
 For example, the income effect would suggest that 
taxpayers will compensate for the tax cost by exerting more effort to 
achieve a higher pre-tax income.
178
 
In short, theory does not clearly ordain that higher tax rates would be too 
distortionary or that capital should be tax-exempt. Renowned economists 
have argued that the realistic implications of the optimal tax literature 
include relatively high marginal rates (at least at high incomes) and taxing 
capital.
179
  
A related controversy involves the extent to which the income tax can 
impose a burden on the return to capital with taxpayers able to make 
portfolio adjustments. Some have argued that portfolio adjustments would 
allow most of the return to escape from tax, while others have disputed the 
underlying assumptions and implications.
180
 Even assuming that the income 
tax does substantially burden the return to capital, an important 
consideration is the potential for “lock-in” of investments during periods of 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); George K. Yin, 
Accommodating the “Low-Income” in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax World, 2 FLA. 
TAX REV. 445 (1995). 
 177. See Chris William Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for 
Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867, 868-70, 869 n.9 (2010) (reviewing 
literature critiquing the assumptions of the tax substitution argument before “meet[ing] the 
argument on its own turf” and rejecting it). 
 178. See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 858-
59 (2001) (noting that “it is difficult to predict a priori” whether the income effect or 
substitution effect will predominate). 
 179. See Daniel Shaviro, The Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality, 
71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 83, 149-50 (2016) (“It is fair to say that the above quasi-consensus, 
even insofar as it ever held true, no longer does. For example, in recent years, three 
prominent and indeed ‘A-list’ economists—Nobelist Peter Diamond, possible future 
Nobelist Emmanuel Saez, and Thomas Piketty—have written . . . . that marginal tax rates 
should be steeply graduated, and indeed should probably exceed 70% at the top of the U.S. 
income distribution [and] that capital income and inheritances should be taxed, with optimal 
high-end tax rates in a well-designed estate tax possibly exceeding 50%.”). 
 180. Compare Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of 
Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23 (1996) (explaining the theory that the income tax burdens 
the risk-free and inframarginal return of a taxpayer’s portfolio “in a manner directly related 
to their borrowing rate”), with James R. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1169-75 (probing 
assumptions of the theory and concluding that “strong evidence suggests that an annual 
income tax that limits the deductibility of investment losses burdens high-income taxpayers 
even though they receive the bulk of their income from investments”).  
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high capital gains tax rates. Although mark-to-market accounting should 
solve that problem, under the current system, the lock-in effect of capital 
gains rates (exacerbated by the potential for step-up in basis at death) 
presents a substantial roadblock to radically increasing revenue from capital 
gains.
181
 
Empirical studies have examined what real-world relationship, if any, 
exists among inequality, tax rates, and growth. As Professors Caron and 
Repetti report, “all nineteen of the published studies that have examined the 
relationship of high concentrations of income to economic growth at the 
beginning of a period that extends fifteen years or longer have found that 
high income concentration correlates with poor economic growth.”182 This 
finding may obfuscate other causal relationships. For example, critics of 
high tax rates would assert that high inequality leads to high taxes and that 
high taxes in turn lead to low investment.
183
 Indeed, one study might be 
construed to support that claim, to the extent that it concluded that low 
capital investment led to low growth.
184
 Other studies that included tax rates 
as part of their model rejected the notion that high tax rates reduced 
growth.
185
 
Inherited wealth may be a particularly harmful source of inequality. One 
study found that gross domestic product is negatively correlated with 
inherited wealth and positively correlated with self-made wealth.
186
 The 
authors posited ways in which entrenched heirs may engage in 
anticompetitive behavior.
187
 
Whatever the empirical support refuting the harms of high tax rates, this 
issue is bound to remain contested. To the extent that the relationship 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See David Kamin, How to Tax the Rich, 146 TAX NOTES 119, 123 (2015). 
 182. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy The Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to 
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1268 (2013).  
 183. See id. at 1264.  
 184. See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic 
Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH 
AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23 (Alex Cukierman et al. eds., 1992). 
 185. See Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and 
Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 32 
ECON. INQUIRY 172, 172 (1992) (sixty-three-country study); Roberto Perotti, Growth, 
Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 151 
(1996). 
 186. Randall K. Morck et al., Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic 
Growth: The Canadian Disease?, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 319 (Randall 
K. Morck ed., 2000). 
 187. Id. at 362. 
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between taxes, inequality, and growth takes a long time to play out, critics 
will somewhat reasonably allege that the results could have been impacted 
by other factors.
188
 The notion, however, that the reduction of inequality via 
the tax system spurs economic growth finds substantial theoretical and 
empirical support.  
E. Valuation of Property  
Taxpayers would have an incentive to undervalue their assets for wealth 
tax purposes and would generally benefit from an informational advantage 
compared to the government. The potential for abuse is especially acute if 
the assets are not publicly traded. Given the likelihood of a low tax rate and 
the likelihood that taxpayers will engage in creative planning or win 
valuation disputes,
189
 one would naturally ask if only publicly traded 
property should be included in the tax base.  
The limitation of a wealth tax to publicly traded property would, in turn, 
generate two additional problems. First, apportionment of debt could be 
complicated, particularly if certain assets are excluded.
190
 Second, taxpayers 
might radically alter their investments to shift toward private equity rather 
than publicly traded property. Professor Schenk, however, suggests that 
private equity is not an adequate substitute,
191
 indicating that efficiency 
losses from portfolio adjustments should be minor.  
Asset-testing should not be reflexively rejected because potential 
valuation difficulties. A comparative approach would likely find non-U.S. 
experience helpful to build on. A significant minority of European nations 
levy (or have levied) general wealth taxes.
192
 In a few Muslim-majority 
nations, mandatory zakat functions as a tax rather than a voluntary 
contribution.
193
 At the time of Professor Lehner’s survey, wealth tax rates in 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Cf. Caron & Repetti, supra note 182, at 1273 (noting that shorter term studies on 
inequality and growth may be defective because “the relationship is not a short-term 
relationship,” while “long-term studies suggest that other forces may be involved”). 
 189. Cf. Caron & Repetti, 5 Easy Pieces, supra note 18 (describing success of minority 
discounts, Crummey trusts, and Grantor Retained Annuity Trust transactions in reducing 
estate tax).  
 190. Cf. Schenk, supra note 117, at 452-53. 
 191. See Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based 
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 529-30 (2004). 
 192. See Moris Lehner, The European Experience with a Wealth Tax: A Comparative 
Discussion, 53 TAX L. REV. 615, 619 (2000). 
 193. See Russell Powell, Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory and Economic Policy 
from Islamic Jurisprudence, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 43-44 (2009) (“Zakat (sometimes 
transliterated as zakah in English) is the obligation of almsgiving within Islam. It is the Third 
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Europe were quite low and generally close to 1% of net wealth.
194
 
Similarly, although zakat rates vary, a default of 2.5% applies.
195
 Even 
while rejecting wealth taxes on grounds of tax justice, Professor Rakowski 
states: 
I am less pessimistic, partly because the experience of European 
countries with wealth taxes seems to show that they can be 
administered tolerably well and partly because it seems doubtful 
that low-level wealth taxes would have much effect on people’s 
work ethic or frugality or alter significantly the mix of assets 
they hold.
196
  
A method of minimizing valuation costs that has been suggested in the 
mark-to-market context is to levy a retrospective tax upon the disposition of 
an asset, using a deemed rate of return to approximate the taxpayer’s asset 
values in prior years.
197
 It is not apparent that this could be applied to 
annual wealth taxation or asset-based phase-outs in an administrable way. 
Another approach could be to use cliffs, especially if only extremely high 
wealth taxpayers were targeted. There are, to be sure, difficult 
administrative issues to be confronted in taxing wealth. But the number of 
countries that have maintained a wealth tax suggests that the idea should 
not be discarded out of hand. 
III. Potential Income Tax Responses 
At the outset, it should be noted that the tax policy options described 
below are responses rather than perfect solutions to the problems of wealth 
and income inequality. Multiple approaches, some non-tax, will likely be 
necessary to reduce inequality.
198
 This Article also acknowledges that 
significant design challenges must be addressed in incorporating taxpayer 
                                                                                                                 
Pillar of Islam and is a requirement for all believers. In the early development of the Islamic 
community, zakat was collected as a tax by the state, and the funds were distributed to 
defined needy groups.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 194. See generally Lehner, supra note 192. 
 195. See Powell, supra note 193, at 51. 
 196. Rakowski, supra note 117, at 271-72. 
 197. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 448. 
 198. Cf. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1160 (“A tax system, by itself, will never achieve 
absolutely equal access to the political process. Doing so would require confiscatory rates 
above a certain level of income, which are likely to harm productivity and be politically 
unacceptable. But the tax system can augment other approaches to achieving equal access to 
the political process, such as campaign finance reform.”). 
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wealth into the income tax.
199
 But there are reasons not to abandon an 
income-tax-based solution lightly.  
First, the income tax is the most salient and familiar tax for most 
Americans and is the predominant federal revenue source. The perceived 
fairness of the tax is critical to the success of the voluntary compliance 
regime. Even if ability to pay is malleable, its resilience and timelessness as 
a tax equity norm counsels sustained consideration of how to implement it 
in the income tax. Second, even if other portions of the tax system (for 
example, the estate tax) do something about wealth inequality more 
directly, different taxes have different strengths and weaknesses. Thus, it is 
presumably advantageous for multiple taxes to address the problem of 
wealth inequality.
200
  
Broadly framed, three potential income tax responses are considered 
below: mark-to-market accounting for assets, bringing back platinum 
brackets, and rethinking and expanding phase-outs. Each of these three 
options offers its own mix of advantages and disadvantages.  
The familiar options are important, but do not address the problem of 
wealth inequality so much as the problem of income measurement. Mark-
to-market accounting and the tax brackets do not address the situation 
where taxpayers have equal income but different wealth. To address that 
potential difference among taxpayers, there would need to be some further 
step taken to deny tax benefits to individuals with high wealth relative to 
income. Without mark-to-market accounting, it may be helpful to use 
penetrative brackets or wealth-based phase-outs as an imperfect substitute 
for taxing unrealized gains. 
A. Mark-to-Market 
Even though the public unduly focuses on the benefits to the wealthy 
from deduction loopholes,
201
 they are correct in spirit. The realization rule 
structurally embeds undertaxation of investment income by deferring 
taxation until a sale, exchange, or other disposition of property. The 
realization rule also works in tandem with the step-up in basis for inherited 
property,
202
 which effectively exempts the decedent’s unrealized 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See supra Part II. 
 200. See generally David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, 
Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 357 (2015) (“Because all 
plausible forms of tax measurement are imperfect, it often will be better for governments to 
utilize multiple forms of tax measurement.”). 
 201. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
 202. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012). 
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appreciation for the heirs. Ironically, these broad rules, which do not 
necessarily require any expert gamesmanship, are probably not what 
average citizens have in mind when they criticize loopholes for the wealthy. 
The realization rule may amount to trillions of dollars in tax base 
erosion.
203
 Accordingly, it is critical to do something about this problem if 
the goal is to address differences in wealth within the income tax.
204
 As 
noted above, reforming the realization rule would not really draw 
distinctions between taxpayers based on their wealth, but it would correct 
the measurement of income. And without correct income measurement, it 
would not be clear that truly like taxpayers were being compared if, for 
example, an asset-based phase-out were adopted.
205
  
A mark-to-market tax on property would face administrative challenges, 
especially with respect to real estate and intangibles. One option would be 
to embrace the complications because of the importance of doing something 
about unreported income and the lock-in effect. Moreover, valuation 
complications can be mitigated by imposing a deferral penalty if the system 
only applies to easily valued assets.
206
 If the penalty were insufficient, 
however, the lock-in effect would remain.
207
  
Although realization and the step-up at death create a powerful effect 
together, they do not necessarily have to be repealed together. And one 
would expect section 1014 to fall more easily than the realization rule. 
Carryover basis—the least transformational alternative to section 1014—
would not add much complexity to the tax system. Although section 1014 
arguably once had merit for administrative reasons—that it would be 
difficult to know the decedent’s basis long after his or her death—modern 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See generally David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 
109 TAX NOTES 1047 (2005). 
 204. Analysis of the constitutional issues for mark-to-market taxation lies beyond the 
scope of this Article. It bears mentioning, however, that a more limited mark-to-market 
regime for dealers in securities has existed for some time. See I.R.C. § 475. This provision 
has been upheld by the lower federal courts though has never been reviewed by the Supreme 
Court. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1053. 
 205. See infra Section III.C. 
 206. See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95, 
100 (1999) (“[T]o have the same effective tax rates, the mark-to-market base must have a 
lower nominal rate than the realization base.”).  
 207. Cf. Kamin, supra note 181, at 123 n.29 (stating that “[s]uch an approach might help 
to minimize . . . although certainly not eliminate” planning around the choice of systems). 
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technology has all but eliminated the need for this unfair and distortionary 
provision.
208
 
In addition, the abolition of section 1014 should enhance efficiency. One 
of the problems with the realization rule is that it arguably causes taxpayers 
to retain investments to avoid realizing gain. Neutralizing this lock-in effect 
is one of the arguments in favor of a capital gains preference. However, the 
section 1014 exclusion is incoherent vis-à-vis the lock-in rationale. If 
taxpayers are able to reap the ultimate capital gains preference—complete 
exemption of all unrealized appreciation via step-up in basis at death—by 
holding assets for as long as they can, then they have the ultimate lock-in 
incentive.
209
  
Another alternative to carry-over basis is taxation of unrealized gains at 
the decedent’s death. This would completely remove the problem of record 
keeping for decades and over several taxpayers’ lifetimes. It would also be 
a more effective option to reduce the lock-in effect. Deemed realization at 
death would not represent additional complexity for taxpayers who already 
must value their assets in anticipation of the estate tax, though it could 
conceivably extend that complexity to those who are nowhere near the 
threshold for estate tax liability. 
In sum, repealing the realization rule—or at least section 1014—is 
critically important to measuring income correctly. Even if these 
technicalities are nothing like what the public has in mind, this sort of tax 
reform should tap into public desire to combat loopholes without 
necessarily raising tax rates. These reform options—even the less dramatic 
ones—would also appear to offer important efficiency advantages. 
The chief drawback is complexity, which falls into two different 
versions. First, it may prove easy to overstate the reporting burden for the 
average taxpayer and difficult to counteract misinformation. Although a 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Schmalbeck et al., supra note 92, manuscript at 23-24) (“In sum, in virtually every 
sphere, technological advancements are making tax basis identification viable, even after a 
taxpayer’s death. With respect to the vast majority of valuable assets that a decedent owns 
(e.g., stock and bond investments and business real estate and equipment), tax basis records 
are readily accessible. Admittedly, some of the decedent’s assets (e.g., jewelry and title to a 
residential home) could prove challenging with respect to making accurate tax basis 
identifications. Insofar as these latter assets are concerned, it is important to recognize that, 
in many instances, they generally do not comprise the mainstay of a taxpayer’s net worth.”). 
 209. Admittedly, in terms of lock-in, one could also hope for heirs and their descendants 
to hold on to their inheritance and borrow to fund any consumption. But with no complete 
exemption at death available, and the risk that the tax system will probably at some point 
increase the tax on gains, the benefit of amassing more and more unrealized gains would be 
dubious. 
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cliff (for example, limiting the new rules to taxpayers with $1 million in 
assets) should counteract that sort of objection, it would be an overreaction 
and would create strong incentives to plan around the cliff. Second, the 
difficulty for the public in understanding these rules probably limits their 
effectiveness in fostering the perception of fairness of the tax system.  
It bears repeating that, as important as these measures are in identifying 
the correct amount of income, they do not do anything to distinguish 
between taxpayers with equal incomes and different amounts of wealth. For 
that, this Article suggests looking to a new kind of phase-out, as described 
in Section III.C. 
B. “Platinum” Tax Brackets 
Higher top marginal tax rates, as well as more penetrative brackets, are 
worth considering as an indirect means of addressing wealth inequality. As 
explained in more detail in Section I.B.1, U.S. federal tax history includes 
both statutory elements.
210
 A top bracket of 70% applied throughout the 
1970s. In the 1980s, the highest bracket was lowered to 28%, and in the 
next three decades seesawed until resting at the top marginal rate of 39.6% 
under current law. 
In terms of linking wealth inequality to the income tax, the case in favor 
of bringing back platinum brackets is less clear than the case for some form 
of mark-to-market taxation (whether it be wholesale or simply a revision of 
section 1014). First, although platinum brackets would be salient and easy 
to understand, and although platinum brackets clearly would not add any 
compliance burden for the average taxpayer, the public may not agree that 
the addition of such brackets improves the fairness of the tax system. If, as 
discussed in Section II.B, the public is focused on closing loopholes, the 
reception may be neutral or chilly.  
Second, the economic trade-offs are more debatable than those of mark-
to-market taxation. Although the theoretical case is ambiguous between 
substitution and income effects, the economics literature provides 
substantial support that tax rates for ordinary income could be raised 
significantly without producing an overwhelming countervailing 
response.
211
 In contrast, as Professor David Kamin puts it, “when it comes 
to capital gains and realizations, the Laffer curve lives, and the current rate 
is within striking distance of the top of the curve.”212 Thus, a mark-to-
market system may be a wise prerequisite to seriously considering either 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra Section II.D. 
 212. Kamin, supra note 181, at 120. 
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substantially higher capital gains rates or a “Buffett” rule imposing a 
substantially higher minimum effective rate.
213
  
Third, platinum brackets do not test for wealth. However, high income 
serves as a useful proxy for wealth. And assuming retention of the 
realization rule, platinum brackets could be thought of as a surtax for 
unrealized appreciation, using high income as a proxy for unrealized 
appreciation. 
C. Phase-Out Provisions 
The income tax already includes phase-outs, usually by reference to the 
taxpayer’s AGI or a slightly modified version thereof. For example, 
miscellaneous itemized deductions are cut by the 2% of AGI floor.
214
 
Personal exemptions begin to phase out after approximately $300,000 of 
income for a married couple.
215
 Floors on casualty losses and medical 
expenses increase with AGI.
216 
 
With the caveat that several problems arise upon closer inspection, it 
seems intuitively promising to consider phase-outs that would take into 
account wealth—and to consider phasing out a wider array of tax benefits. 
This possibility has received very little attention in the existing literature.
217
 
Phase-outs are especially worthy of consideration given the popular 
ambivalence toward more straightforward increases to the top tax rates. For 
example, the benefit of the income tax brackets below the top 39.6% 
bracket could be phased out.
218
 Without proposing a set of phase-out 
provisions, this discussion seeks to identify the most promising spaces for 
phase-outs to address wealth inequality. 
Phase-outs are worth further exploration for at least two reasons. First, if 
the public is resistant to high top tax rates, phase-outs may be easier to 
enact. Moreover, even if phase-outs taken together add to the complexity of 
the tax system, and even if income-based phase-outs could be translated 
into more sensible brackets without bubbles,
219
 the phase-out frame 
                                                                                                                 
 213. For an explanation of, as well as a more progressive amendment to, the Buffett rule, 
see Thompson, supra note 25.  
 214. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2012). 
 215. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. 
 216. I.R.C. §§ 165(h)(2), 213(a) (2012). 
 217. Lee Anne Fennell’s work on the importance of willpower to economic success 
recognizes that some tax benefits should be phased out for the wealthy. See Lee Anne 
Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1427-29 (2011). 
 218. Cf. I.R.C. § 11 (2012) (imposing a bubble in the corporate tax to claw back the 
benefit of the lower rate brackets).  
 219. See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text. 
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explicitly tailors benefits to need. This is important not just in terms of 
feasibility but also as an expressive function that may add to the perceived 
fairness of the system. Second, in an income tax that accurately measures 
income, an asset-based phase-out may well be the only way to draw 
distinctions between equal income taxpayers with different wealth. Clearly, 
the tax system is far from that ideal. But many familiar options that are 
motivated by the problem of wealth inequality ultimately relate to income 
measurement rather than wealth inequality among those with the same 
income.  
The central critique levied against phase-outs is that there is no necessity 
to use phase-outs to control budget impact. Despite the potential allure of 
tailoring benefits to recipients with greater need, ultimately one must 
engage with whether the marginal tax rate bubbles that phase-outs 
effectively create are superior to an alternative schedule without a bubble. 
That case is difficult, although clearly it has persuaded some tax scholars to 
argue for income-based phase-outs.
220
  
Though asset-based phase-outs would still create bubbles, such phase-
outs could not simply be redesigned as income tax bracket adjustments. 
This assumes that it would be unconstitutional to deem a small percentage 
of the taxpayer’s wealth to be income.221 Even if the overwhelmingly likely 
effect of a phase-out is to broaden the tax base, an addition to taxable 
income on account of mere ownership of property would likely be held a 
“direct tax.”222  
To recap and refine the foregoing, there are at least three potentially 
promising functions that an asset-based phase-out in the income tax could 
further. First, such a provision could serve as a proxy for a wealth tax, 
though, because the well of income tax benefits runs to a limited depth, this 
proxy tax would necessarily be quite limited compared to a true wealth tax. 
Second, it could accomplish a rough tax on unrealized appreciation. Third, 
even in a mark-to-market income tax, the provision could seek to achieve 
vertical equity, distinguishing between taxpayers with the same income and 
different wealth. 
Income tests could accomplish the first two functions reasonably well. 
The rationale would be that high income serves as a reasonable proxy for 
wealth. Asset-testing could aim to achieve better tailoring at the cost of 
complexity. There is a relatively limited value, however, in the tax benefits 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 221. See infra Section IV.C. 
 222. See infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
446 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:405 
 
 
that could sensibly be put on the table for phase-outs, in relation to the 
substantial administrative costs of asset-testing. Raising the top tax rates, in 
contrast, could raise more revenue with fewer administrative costs. Thus, in 
the absence of preexisting mark-to-market rules, it would seem unduly 
complex to use asset-tested phase-outs to impose a substitute wealth tax or 
a substitute tax on unrealized appreciation. A cliff, rather than a phase-out, 
would likely be the only plausible option without mark-to-market. 
Importantly, these two potential functions of phase-outs would not 
address vertical equity within an ideal income tax. These functions involve 
horizontal equity or a surrogate wealth tax. The space to address both 
wealth inequality and vertical equity is narrow and primarily lies at 
moderate incomes. That is largely because the bite would be nominal for 
those with extremely high wealth.  
To return to the example from the introduction, one might differentiate 
between an investor whose income consists of $50,000 of interest on a 
million-dollar bond and a worker with a $50,000 salary. An asset test 
might, for example, deny the standard deduction, personal exemption, 
lower-rate tax brackets, or personal expense deductions to the investor. At 
higher incomes, the standard deduction and personal exemption would be 
useless, so the system would have to look to different attributes, such as 
itemized deductions or the tax brackets, to make a difference. Assuming 
that business deductions and capital gains brackets (unless assets were 
already marked to market) are off the table, the maximum possible 
distinction that could be made will be limited, particularly in an era with 
relatively low marginal tax rates.  
As an illustration of what could be accomplished, suppose Tara, an 
unmarried taxpayer, has inherited land with a fair market value of $6 
million and an AGI of $500,000 from business operations. Assume, for 
simplicity, that there is no appreciation from year to year. The six lower-
rate tax brackets grant Tara a considerable tax benefit. Channeling Tara’s 
AGI through the lower-rate brackets represents a tax benefit worth 
approximately $44,000.
223
  
This does not necessarily mean that all of the tax benefit to Tara must be 
phased out. Nor does it tell us at what threshold of assets to begin the 
phase-out—or whether to use a cliff instead for simplicity. As an example, 
suppose the goal is to phase out the lower-rate brackets starting at $2 
                                                                                                                 
 223. This assumes 2017 tax brackets. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. The 
calculation multiplies the difference between the top tax bracket (39.6%) and each of the six 
lower brackets (10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%) by the amount of income that would 
otherwise be taxed in such lower bracket.  
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million in assets and to complete the phase-out by $5 million of assets. That 
leaves a phase-out range of $3 million and an income tax bracket range of 
$418,400. Accordingly, one option is to start at the top and lower the 
beginning of the 39.6% bracket by approximately 14 cents per dollar of 
assets in excess of $2 million. A distinct option, given that tax rates rise 
faster at lower incomes, would be to start from the bottom and push income 
into higher brackets.  
The $2 million figure for Tara’s wealth is useful in another sense. It 
represents a net wealth at which losing approximately $40,000 in tax 
benefits approximates a relatively high-rate wealth tax. Wealth taxes 
normally apply a rate of less than 2%, and $40,000 represents 2% of $2 
million. Although the potential sources for phase-outs go beyond the 
brackets, and brackets may be amended, this is a useful starting point for 
analysis. Meanwhile, if the phase-out is capped at approximately $40,000 in 
tax benefits, the impact would necessarily decline in proportion to wealth as 
wealth increases. A $40,000 penalty for a taxpayer with wealth of $20 
million would amount to a very minor wealth tax of 0.2%. Hence the prior 
caveat that the bite would be limited and the distinction would matter most 
for the merely wealthy as opposed to the super-rich.  
Given this phenomenon, a cliff’s simplicity benefits could be attractive. 
A $2 million cliff could mitigate complexity because the valuation question 
would be limited to identifying onto which side of the threshold the 
taxpayer falls rather than identifying a precise value. But cliffs could lead to 
excessive distortions related to planning around the threshold. Professor 
Lee Anne Fennell has suggested that modestly randomized cliffs may 
minimize those distortions with low administrative costs.
224
 
This framework, to be sure, leaves important questions for further 
consideration. Would a cliff be likely to generate considerable distortions? 
How many taxpayers would be clustered close to the cliff?
225
 What assets, 
if any, should be excluded for purposes of a cliff or phase-out? Should the 
typical framework of marriage bonuses and penalties apply? Should a cliff 
or phase-out be adjusted for regional or local differences in cost of living? 
Each of these issues should be considered further before implementation of 
asset-based phase-outs. 
                                                                                                                 
 224. See Fennell, supra note 217, at 1428. 
 225. IRS data suggests that fewer than three million taxpayers have net worth in excess 
of $2 million. See All Top Wealthholders by Size of Net Worth: Table 1 – Personal Wealth 
2007, IRS STAT. OF INCOME DIV. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-all-
top-wealthholders-by-size-of-net-worth (click on “2007” hyperlink).  
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IV. Constitutional Limitations 
A wealth tax would address the problem of wealth inequality more 
immediately and directly than either the income tax or the estate tax.
226
 
Notwithstanding those advantages, wealth taxation—and even potentially 
income tax phase-outs involving asset tests—would present the question of 
whether the Constitution requires apportionment of the tax.
227
 As discussed 
below, an apportionment requirement would effectively block the tax, 
because an apportioned tax would be arbitrary and unfair.
228
 
A. Apportionment Rule for Direct Taxes 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts, and Excises,”229 provided that “No Capitation, or other 
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration 
herein before directed to be taken.”230 The Constitution further provides that 
“direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according 
to their respective Numbers.”231 
The meaning of “direct tax” appears to have been unclear from the 
beginning.
232
 As a rough gloss, such a tax is “not contingent on anything 
but being or existence.”233 Among the likely original purposes for the 
apportionment rule are protecting large states with low population, 
protecting states in which slavery was legal, and avoiding crowding out 
states from levying poll taxes and land taxes.
234
 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See Daniel Altman, To Reduce Inequality, Tax Wealth, Not Income, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/opinion/to-reduce-inequality-tax-
wealth-not-income.html (“Wealth inequality has worsened for two decades and is now at an 
extreme level. Replacing the income, estate and gift taxes with a progressive wealth tax 
would do much more to reduce it than any other tax plan being considered in Washington.”). 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 228. There are examples of early apportioned taxes to fund wars, and the Civil War 
income tax was enacted after discussion of a potential property tax. See Brownlee, supra 
note 61, at 15. 
 229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 232. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 563 (1895) (citing notes of 
James Madison), confirmed and expanded, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Springer v. United States, 
102 U.S. 586, 597 (1880) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s briefs); Hylton v. United States, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796) (Patterson, J., concurring) (“no clear and precise idea”); 
JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL TAXATION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 352 (2013). 
 233. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 344. 
 234. Id. at 360-63. 
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Apportionment of a wealth tax would be an unworkable “fiasco” in that a 
state’s share of the total tax liability would be “arrived at without regard to 
the actual wealth held by the taxpayers in each state”: 
Take two states close to one another in size. Maryland, in the 
2010 census, had 5,773,552 people, or 1.87% of the population, 
while Missouri had 5,988,927 people, or 1.93% of the nation. . . . 
Maryland in 2010 was a much wealthier state than Missouri. 
Incomes were higher in Maryland, with $34,849 per capita, as 
against $24,724 in Missouri . . . . 
 . . . Yet according to the constitutionally required formula, 
Missourians collectively will have to pay about the same, or a 
little more, in federal wealth tax, than Marylanders.
235
  
Such a system would impose a fundamentally unfair burden on states, and 
by extension taxpayers, where there is high population relative to wealth. 
The following subsections examine the triggers for the apportionment 
requirement. 
B. Scope of the Apportionment Rule 
As Justice Chase recognized in the seminal case of Hylton v. United 
States,
236
 apportionment and uniformity
237
 are a dichotomy
238—a direct tax 
that must be apportioned will apply different rates to the same base: 
For example: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 
dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; 
and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000. 
The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax 
of owners in the other. A. in one State, would pay for his 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Matthew J. Franck, The Constitutional Fiasco of a Wealth Tax, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 
2012) http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/333660/constitutional-fiasco-wealth-tax-
matthew-j-franck. 
 236. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 237. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be 
uniform). Cummings suggests that the Court “mostly employed the term indirect as a 
simplistic label for imposts, duties, and excises.” CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 340 
(positing that the Court assumed such taxes could not be direct because of constitutional 
requirement of uniformity). 
 238. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173 (observing that Congress “were to observe two rules in 
imposing [them], namely, the rule of uniformity, when they laid duties, imposts, or excises; 
and the rule of apportionment, according to the census, when they laid any direct tax”); see 
also CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 342. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
450 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:405 
 
 
carriage 8 dollars, but B. in the other state, would pay for his 
carriage, 80 dollars.
239
 
Justice Chase observed that the rate differential would lead to “great 
inequality and injustice.”240  
Justice Chase then extended this observation to a general principle that it 
would be “unreasonable” to infer that the Constitution would require 
Congress to adopt the apportionment method when its application would be 
unjust.
241
 To avoid arbitrary variation in tax rates, the Court held that the 
carriage tax was constitutional without apportionment.
242
 The same 
injustice would seemingly follow, however, if Congress taxed land via the 
apportionment method. Yet Justice Chase posited in dictum that the only 
taxes contemplated by the “direct tax” language are “a capitation, or poll 
tax” and “a tax on LAND.”243 In sum, the Court’s first foray into defining 
“direct tax” suggests that the concept should be extremely narrow to limit 
unjust outcomes.  
Professor Joseph Dodge offers two insights that buttress the Hylton 
logic. First, population was viewed as a proxy for land wealth, which would 
tend to limit the variation in effective tax rates on an apportioned land 
tax.
244
 Second, if apportionment was included to satisfy Southern interests, 
a narrow construction would further that purpose more than a broad 
construction: 
Apportionment according to population requires that poorer 
per-capita (i.e., Southern) states be discriminated against. This 
effect would have been compounded by the fact that slaves 
counted as three-fifths, resulting in an increase in the quotas of 
the slave states without any accompanying increase in any likely 
tax base (except a property tax in which slaves were counted). In 
sum, the regional-oppression rationale for apportionment 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 183. 
 243. Id. at 175 (capitalization in original). The opinions of Justices Paterson and Iredell 
agree on this limited scope. See id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); id. at 183 (Iredell, J.). Justice 
Wilson’s crisp opinion concurs that the tax is constitutional without further explanation. Id. 
at 183-84 (Wilson, J).  
 244. See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of 
Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 921, 924 (2009). 
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actually favors a narrow concept of “direct tax” that is limited to 
taxes on real estate, plus capitation taxes and requisitions.
245
 
Professor Dodge nevertheless concludes that “direct tax” should encompass 
ad valorem taxes on any property except intangibles.
246
  
Professor Dodge’s central thesis is that some coherent principle must 
account for the accepted and uncontroversial categories of requisitions, 
head taxes, and land taxes, all of which require apportionment.
247
 Professor 
Dodge observes that “[a]pportionment among states requires that any item 
subject to the tax have a definite geographical location in a state, because 
the tax rate for a state is the state’s quota divided by the value (or quantity) 
of the subject of the tax within the state.”248  
The practical necessity of a physical situs for apportionment persuasively 
explains why the original meaning of “direct tax” may have excluded a tax 
on intangibles from the apportionment rule. But if one utilizes a formalist 
approach (limited to capitations, requisitions, and land taxes), a tax on 
tangible personal property should not be construed as a direct tax simply 
because it is (functionally) capable of being apportioned.
249
  
After a long period without hearing direct tax cases, the Supreme Court 
arguably applied a deferential, formalistic approach in cases after the Civil 
War.
250
 As Jasper Cummings explains: 
Up to 1895 the Court identified direct taxes based on the form in 
which Congress had chosen to cast the tax: if Congress did not 
apportion a tax, and particularly if Congress called it an excise 
tax, the Court uniformly ruled it was not a direct tax that had to 
be apportioned.
251
  
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. at 893 (footnote omitted). 
 246. Id. at 843, 922. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Id. at 922. 
 249. Cf. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796); Dodge, supra note 
244, at 924 (noting that formalism “has its upside in the present context”).  
 250. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (noting Civil War income 
tax not a direct tax); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1869) (holding that a 
tax on insurance company premiums not a direct tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 
Wall.) 533, 549 (1869). Importantly, cases decided after Pollock seem to follow Hylton’s 
rationale. See infra. 
 251. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 67. Cummings posits two explanations for the 
Supreme Court’s reticence to strike down taxes on substance over form grounds: a kind of 
tax exceptionalism in deferring to Congress on tax matters, and that “perhaps the Court 
wearied of contending with economic distinctions that were basically irresolvable.” Id. at 70. 
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Even after 1895, the Supreme Court only once struck down a tax as a direct 
tax and otherwise distinguished taxes burdening capital, generally 
concluding that they could qualify as excises. Thus, there appears to be at 
least a plausible argument that Congress may enact a wealth tax on personal 
property even if a land tax must be apportioned.
252
  
C. Potential Loopholes and Pitfalls 
The invalidation of the 1894 federal income tax as an unapportioned 
direct tax is hard to square with the narrow scope articulated in Hylton.
253
 
Moreover, income taxes had been enacted and collected during the Civil 
War era and were upheld in Springer v. United States.
254
 The last Civil War 
era income tax expired in 1871.
255
 In 1894, Congress enacted a new income 
tax, which was promptly challenged as unconstitutional.
256
 The Supreme 
Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. held that the income tax 
was a direct tax that was unconstitutional for want of apportionment.
257
 The 
Court essentially looked through rental income to the source, the land, 
“unable to perceive any ground for the alleged distinction.”258 
The Sixteenth Amendment neutralized the Pollock Court’s look-through 
logic with respect to income and freed Congress to enact an income tax in 
                                                                                                                 
Cummings notes, “When Congress episodically chose during the 1800s to collect taxes from 
persons based on the value of property they owned, it apportioned the total tax revenue 
desired among the states, according to the census.” Id. at 339. 
 252. Scholarship in this area is diverse. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the 
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1999) (apportionment repealed by Thirteenth 
Amendment); Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the 
Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–107 (2001) (defending tax shifting 
analysis and extending to consumption tax); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional 
Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297–99 (2004) 
(arguing that apportionment applies only if equitable, primarily reducing the scope to 
universal capitations and requisitions); Schenk, supra note 117, at 441-42 (suggesting that 
recharacterization as an income tax can save a broad-based wealth tax). 
 253. Cf. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 344 (“The foregoing generalities forecast the 
difficult questions: what about taxes that appeared to be imposed on the ownership of 
property other than land, and what about taxes that fell indirectly on land; are excises on the 
use of property in a certain way direct or indirect?”). 
 254. 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
 255. Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 1861-1872, 67 TAX LAW. 311, 
330 (2014) (noting debate in favor of an extension but that allowing the tax to expire was 
“the path of least resistance”). 
 256. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 433 (1895), confirmed and 
expanded, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 257. Id. at 583. 
 258. Id. at 580-81. 
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1913. The Sixteenth Amendment did not, however, abolish other 
constitutional tax requirements.
259
 Cummings argues that “the abandonment 
of lookthrough was limited . . . presumably leaving any other federal tax 
that was not an income tax subject to being found to be a tax on property 
ownership.”260 
The Court had reasoned that direct taxes cannot be shifted, and because a 
tax on income from land cannot be shifted, such a tax is direct.
261
 This test 
did not follow from Hylton and failed to account for the high likelihood of 
shifting taxes on land to tenants.
262
 Pollock, upon rehearing, extended the 
scope of “direct tax” to a tax on “invested personal property” or the income 
from such property.
263
  
Not long after the Court decided Pollock, it undermined the underlying 
logic of the opinion. In 1900, the Court rejected the tax shifting rationale in 
deciding that an estate tax was not a direct tax.
264
 In 1904, the Court upheld 
a gross receipts tax on sugar refiners.
265
 And in 1911, the Court 
distinguished the corporate income tax as an excise tax,
266
 arguably using a 
“form over substance” approach.267 However, in Eisner v. Macomber,268 the 
Court held that “to tax without apportionment a stockholder’s interest in 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 393 (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 
U.S. 1, 12, 18-19 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (“dealing solely 
with the restriction imposed by the Sixteenth Amendment on . . . putting it in the class of 
direct, to which it would not otherwise belong, in order to subject it to the regulation of 
apportionment”)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 558 (“Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can 
shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are 
considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether 
real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot 
be avoided, are direct taxes.”). 
 262. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 71. Surprisingly, a consumer sales tax 
presumably is not a direct tax, even though its burden could be difficult to shift. Id. Chief 
Justice Fuller, author of the majority opinion in Pollock, has been described as “the prime 
example of that luckiest of all persons known to the law—the innocent third party without 
notice.” Id. at 73 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 
(1993)). 
 263. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 628-29. 
 264. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 88 (1900); see also CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 
379. 
 265. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904). 
 266. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
 267. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 68. 
 268. 252 U.S. 189, 218 (1920). 
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accumulated earnings prior to dividend” declaration was “overruled” by 
Pollock.  
Most recently, in 2012 the Court, citing Hylton, Pollock, and Macomber, 
grappled with the meaning of “direct tax” in upholding the shared 
responsibility payment,
269
 triggered by meeting an income threshold and 
failing to obtain health insurance.
270
 But the significance of a hat tip to 
Pollock and Macomber should not be overstated.  
To conclude that the shared responsibility payment is “plainly not a tax 
on the ownership of land or personal property” is hardly a ratification of the 
underlying logic of the expansionist cases.
271
 Moreover, this conclusion, far 
from embracing that logic, seems to undermine it. Arguably, the Court took 
care to apply the requirement that was misapplied in Pollock, that the 
payment “cannot be avoided.”272  
Professor Erik Jensen argues to the contrary: that despite the “sloppy” 
opinion, it is “hard to read” the opinion other than to imply that taxes on 
income from property are “direct.”273 Professor Jensen concedes that “some 
unapportioned federal taxes on property might be shoehorned into the 
‘taxes on income’ box.”274 Specifically, the Court in NFIB contemplated the 
example of a penalty on houses without energy efficient windows, adjusted 
for income, filing status, and reported on a tax return.
275
 The opinion finds 
no fault in this hypothetical, clearly concluding that the penalty constitutes 
a “tax,” but failing to specify whether it is a tax on income or otherwise 
direct.
276
 
To trigger apportionment for an income tax provision, a court would 
have to distinguish the shared responsibility payment, which was held not 
to be a direct tax. It would also need to differentiate an income tax penalty 
from the income tax penalty for windows clearly contemplated as a valid 
tax in NFIB. The underlying rationale is a mystery, but the facts of the case 
and the hypothetical suggest that the Court would be reluctant to strike 
down income taxes that distinguish between taxpayers because of their 
personal characteristics or property. An asset-based phase-out would seem 
                                                                                                                 
 269. See I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2012). 
 270. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570-71 (2012). 
 271. Id. at 571.  
 272. See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 558, 628-29; CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 71. 
 273. Erik M. Jensen, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Today?, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 818-19 (2014). 
 274. Id. at 821. 
 275. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 569. 
 276. Id.; Jensen, supra note 273, at 822.  
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to be analogous to the drafty windows tax penalty from NFIB. Notably, the 
shared responsibility payment and the hypothetical window surtax are 
avoidable if the taxpayer has no income. 
Professor Schenk’s insight that an ex ante wealth tax can be a proxy for a 
low-rate income tax
277
 is analytically appealing. But this essentially turns 
Pollock’s “look-through” on its head, by looking through a mass of wealth 
to approximate the income. This logic seems vulnerable. Although 
Professor Schenk’s motivation is, in part, to anticipate portfolio adjustments 
that would reduce the tax burden,
278
 a court would probably ask why not 
mark-to-market? Perhaps the fatal flaw of distinguishing income from 
wealth, in the absence of any discernible cash flows or appreciation, is that 
the tax would be automatic and inescapable. Although asset-based phase-
outs may be practically inescapable and would increase a taxpayer’s 
effective rate of tax, the implicit no-income escape hatch represents a 
substantive difference from a direct tax. 
In sum, it is unlikely that a federal wealth tax may reach land. Even 
Justice Chase’s opinion in Hylton, applying a rule of reason, presupposed 
that a land tax would be a direct tax.
279
 It is perhaps more plausible that the 
Court would overrule Pollock and uphold an unapportioned federal wealth 
tax on personal property.
280
 In contrast, an income tax with asset-based 
phase-out provisions seems unlikely to trigger apportionment, given the 
latest gloss on “direct tax” in NFIB.281  
V. Conclusion 
This Article has explored how the federal tax system has slumped while 
wealth and income inequality have intensified. It has drawn from a number 
of perspectives, including theories of tax justice, research on public 
opinion, and economic perspectives, to legitimize a wealth-based response 
in the income tax. Although a wealth tax could be a more powerful 
antidote, the Article seeks a work-around in light of the limitations of the 
Constitution’s apportionment rule and avoids relying on the estate tax. 
In the wake of the election of 2016, it remains imperative to envision 
new responses to inequality through the tax system. This Article has taken 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 441 (“To pass constitutional muster, the wealth tax 
proposed here easily could be reframed as an income tax with a base equal to the risk-free 
return to certain assets.”). 
 278. Id. at 436-41. 
 279. See supra notes 236-243 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 261-263 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 269-276 and accompanying text. 
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initial steps toward designing wealth-based phase-outs in the income tax. 
Although the effect of such phase-out provisions would be modest, asset-
based phase-outs in the income tax should be able to pass muster under the 
Constitution without apportionment. Moreover, phase-outs would appear to 
be more consistent with the limitations of current public opinion than estate 
tax reform. 
Trump-style populism seems unlikely to result in sharply progressive tax 
policy, particularly in terms of the top income tax rate or the estate tax. 
Moreover, the House tax reform bill is contrary to then-candidate Trump’s 
calls during the campaign of 2016 for curtailing the step-up in basis at death 
and deferral of foreign income.
282
 It is possible, however, that the million-
dollar income bracket implementing a tax cut under the House bill
283
 will 
someday be cited and repurposed to implement more progressive tax rates. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The TCJA, however, proposes to terminate 
the estate tax after 2024 without ending the step-up in basis. TCJA §§ 1601-1602. It would also 
provide an exemption for the foreign-source portion of dividends from foreign corporations to 
certain U.S. corporate shareholders. TCJA §§ 4001. As this Article goes to press, President 
Trump has expressed support for the TCJA without addressing these provisions that are 
seemingly at odds with his prior statements. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Statement from the President on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/02/statement-president-tax-cuts-and-
jobs-act. 
 283. TCJA § 1001(a). 
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